Sunday,
February 12, 2006
Vol. III No. 4 |
Welcome to the
Over the Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing is
being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the world.
Its aim
is to promote flight
safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build enthusiasm
for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
Who would have ever imagined the complexity of today's general aviation industry? We've got everything from affordable very light jets to even more affordable light sport aircraft. New aircraft designs are springing up every day. More digital technology is being packed into homebuilt RV-9s than were aboard the first space shuttle. Today's instrument panels range from the 20th century "six pack" to the 21st century dual glass digital displays. While this may sound like a self-serving statement, few members of the general aviation community face more challenges today than an independent flight instructor. Unlike his or her instructional brethren working for a flight school who flies the same fleet of airplanes day after day, the independent CFI finds himself instructing in whatever flying machine his or her students own. In any given week, for example, I may instruct in a Cessna 152, Piper Warrior, Cessna 172, Cirrus SR22, and a Columbia 400. That's in addition to my own Cessna Centurion (T-210). Next week I begin two students in a Diamond Katana and an Allegro. Imagine the plight of designated pilot examiners (DPEs) who are also flight instructors. They have an infinite variety of general aviation aircraft within which they conduct practical tests! The range of training airplanes runs from metal airplanes powered by engines not much larger than found on a small tractor with a single marginally working nav/com to glass composite airframes powered by twin turbocharged beasts and equipped with double glass digital displays. No . . . today's student pilot has it even harder! While we independent CFIs pity ourselves, think about today's primary and instrument students. The glass cockpit folks have to learn not only their sophisticated avionics, they are also responsible for knowing how to navigate on the emergency "steam gauges." Similarly, the "steam gauge only" pilots have to get up to speed with the latest in GPS and eventually glass panel technology. Likewise, pilots trained in metal airplanes are stepping up to rivetless glass composite airframes with narrower normal operating envelopes than their metal predecessors. This is sort of a double whammy that didn't exist much before 1999. But it is not the first time in aviation history that flight students have had to embrace both old and new technology and it certainly will not be the last. Who is watching?
Blame it on the absence of any meaningful tort reform and out-of-control courtroom juries if you like. But the real problem continues to be us. We are the guys and girls who continue to bend airplanes and seriously hurt or kill ourselves and passengers in the process. We do this to the tune of over 550 serious accidents year after year, with over 50 percent of these involving fatalities. Nearly every one of these accidents result in six and seven figure payouts by our insurance carriers. When we include the thousands of our negligent little fender benders to the annual list of serious accidents each year, it is a wonder that we can afford aircraft insurance at all. Time for Serious Change To their credit, the major players in the general aviation community are trying to bring about change. The FAA, aircraft manufactures, FBOs, flight schools, AOPA, EAA, and NAFI are all doing what they can to improve flight safety. But it isn't happening fast enough.
We can do this, too, if we cut through all the hype about how "safe" general aviation supposedly is. Truth is, it isn't. As John and Martha King of King Schools pointed out at Oshkosh last year, "We have an equal chance of getting seriously injured or killed in a light aircraft as we do in riding a motorcycle!" While these may seem like the best of times for general aviation, we will not begin to approach the remarkable safety record of the airlines until we adopt the same recurrent training philosophy as the airlines. When we do, our accident rates will drop precipitously and our insurance premiums will once again become affordable to us all. Yes, our own training requirements and related costs will increase and, as a result, our pilot numbers may drop. But it is better that this happens than to see a wholesale bail out of general aviation pilots and aircraft owners because they can no longer afford the insurance! It is better that those who are unwilling to pay the price for proficiency to stop flying than to see one of these myopic pilots drill themselves into a crowded airliner . . . or worse. Yes, these may be the best of times, but things could change in a heartbeat!
One of the great past times we pilots enjoy is to sit around the home drome and score landings on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being highest). This scoring process includes deducting 3 points for each bounce and 5 points for hitting the nose wheel. Points are then added or deducted based upon other less than precise subjective measures. The most sophisticated judges actually have large number signs they hold up for all to see their scores! So how does one receive a maximum score? Answer: Think like a wine maker! As fine wine must be properly aged, landing aircraft, too, must go through an aging process. Actually, it is more like a "speed diminishing" process. This "speed diminishing" process begins just as the airplane settles over the runway threshold. The runway threshold speed is typically somewhere around 1.3 times the airplane's stalling speed in the landing configuration (Vso). If the Vso is 44KIAS, then its threshold crossing speed should be close to 57KIA. But that is MUCH too fast to actually land! Here comes the wine making part . . . Many flight students (and non-proficient veteran pilots), like the makers of cheap wine, like to rush the process. Once over the runway surface, they attempt to "fly" the airplane right to the ground. The tires strike the grass, blacktop, or concrete with predictable consequences.
The tires BOUNCE off the runway surface like a rubber ball, jolting the airplane and its occupants in a teeth clenching, bone jarring fashion (-3 points). Airborne again, the hapless pilot pushes forward on the yoke. Bang goes on the nose wheel on the runway (-5 points). Eventually, the laws of physics play out and the airplane stops bouncing and slows to the point that it actually remains on the ground! How simple it would be if we pilots simply held the airplane just two or three feet off of the runway until it runs out of flying speed (Vso). This should happen just one foot off the ground as illustrated below. With no more flying energy left, the airplane settles smoothly and remains planted on the runway (10 points)!
Practice runway hovering Again like making wine, mastering perfect landings is an art form. It takes careful instruction and lots of practice. Begin by finding the longest runway possible. You might want to avoid KJFK, KORD, or KLAX . . . but there are plenty of other low volume airports where local tower chiefs will thank you for keeping their "click rates" up. In practicing perfect landings, make your normal approach to landing, then set your power for MCA (minimal controllable airspeed). Then "hover taxi" just two feet off of all but the last remaining 1,500 feet of runway. Get in the practice of looking out the side window to judge your altitude. At that point, you either bring the power to off and land OR apply full power and go around.
There are only two things you should be watching as your practice this exercise. One, of course, is the runway. The other is the airspeed indicator. Attempting to "feel" your airspeed does not work. LOOK at your airspeed indicator! Warning: It takes consummate throttle control to perform this exercise properly. We're talking "tweaking" here, not pushing, pulling, or cramming the throttle lever. Ultimately, the key is to allow all of your flying speed to bleed off at the first instant your wheels kiss the runway . . . not a second before! Quality Guarantee! Dedicate three hours to this practice session and your landings, if they were wine, will win the gold at the VinItaly international wine competition!
The most common reason for radio failure is pilot error. Either the volume was inadvertently turned down, the incorrect audio panel button pushed, or the incorrect frequency dialed in. When any of these radio faults occur, what do you do? It should go without saying (but bears repeating), fly the airplane. The accident files are filled with disasters resulting from a single pilot or an entire flight deck crew attending to an in-flight electrical or mechanical problem instead of flying the airplane! Remember, airplanes fly perfectly well without any radios. Next, look for the obvious. If one or both of your radios worked during your pre-flight inspection, odds are slim that something broke enroute. Check the volume, check your audio panel selections, then check your frequency. Check your Alternator!
Still not working? Try your back up handheld radio. Don't expect much here, however. Handhelds cannot transmit beyond 10 or 12 miles unless they have an exterior aircraft antenna. Serious trouble brewing up front??? In the old days, communications and navigational radios were in two separate boxes. Today, of course, they are combined into a single box. Keep in mind that whatever caused your communication radios to tank could migrate over and possibly take out your navigation radios as well. If that problem, God forbid, is a smoldering electrical fire, your vacuum line may soon be compromised. Imagine . . . no radios, no electrical, no vacuum, in solid IMC! Your dead! Go to Plan B
When landing, simply enter the traffic pattern flow and land. If you're landing at a tower controlled field, do the same thing, but look for light gun signals from the tower. Remain in the pattern until you see a steady green light, then land. No green light! Either remain in the pattern for another couple of circuits. Still no green, go some place else. In IFR conditions - Use a bit of common sense! The FAA has backed itself in a corner in this scenario and shows little signs of getting itself out. On the one hand, the FAA's Instrument Procedures Handbook says:
FAR 91.185, however, takes another approach. It lays out an elaborate set of rules that keep you in the system to your clearance limit or destination. See below:
So what is a girl with a two-way radio failure in IMC supposed to do?
She takes off from Richmond in VFR conditions. She enters IFR conditions at 2,500' AGL on the climb out. Just then, both of her communication radios fail. She goes through all of the trouble-shooting steps listed above, but nothing works. Having received her initial and instrument training at the "Blind Obedience Flight School," she whips out her FAR/AIM and rapidly goes to FAR 91.185. No emergency exists in her mind. Remember, she just left VFR conditions several hundred feet below. "No problem," she says aloud to herself. "I'll just continue motoring along in IMC per FAR 91.185 for the next four hours through the busiest airspace in the entire world."
Keep in mind that, in this scenario, Sally doesn't know what caused her two radios to simultaneously quit working. My guess is that her alternator failed and she doesn't know it yet. I figure she has, maybe, 30 minutes of battery time before she loses her VOR capability. Remember, once the juice is gone, the transponder goes as well. And, just to keep things challenging here, she forgot to recharge the batteries in her handheld GPS and her handheld two-way radio.
Dozens of international and domestic arrivals and departures to Dulles, Philadelphia, Newark, LaGuardia, JFK, and Boston's Logan may have to be re-routed just in case Sally decides to suddenly change her direction. Now, let's add a bit of post-911 paranoia. The folks in the Air Traffic Command Center in Virginia get concerned that perhaps Sally is not really Sally! Perhaps she is a terrorist!!!! An urgent call is sent to the Homeland Security Department's evening watch officer. The scramble order is sent to launch Blackhawk helicopters and a flight of F-16s to intercept what could be a real national terrorist threat. Problem . . . it is IFR out there. The interceptors cannot get a visual on Sally. They cannot talk with Sally. Her transponder no longer works so they have difficulty identifying her on radar. And Sally cannot see the warning flares being shot across her path. Scenario for disaster . . . all caused by literal interpretation of FAR 91.185! Okay . . . what would you do in this scenario?
Please click HERE and indicate your choice and reasons. The results of this survey will be reported in the next issue of "Over the Airwaves." Aeronautical Decision Making and Risk Management Assessment From a life or death perspective, there is no right or wrong answer. Sally must make a choice based upon the risks she perceives. Admittedly, the possible terrorist plot complicates the scenario, but these are spooky times. I selected the busiest airspace in the world for this scenario to take place, but busy airspace now exists just about everywhere. And yes, Sally did graduate from the "Blind Obedience Flight School" so she knows the rules cold. Tough call!
I was out training recently with a pilot friend in his own airplane that he had purchased two to three years earlier. He was working with me on his commercial pilot certificate. As was our custom after each training session, I asked him to request an ILS approach back to his home airport. After receiving his approach clearance, I reached up and "failed" his Garmin 430 GPS, which served as his #1 nav/com. He properly set up his #2 nav/com radio for the approach. Then he said, "Bob, I can't fly an ILS approach on my #2 radio alone because it does not have a glideslope." Startling Discovery! "Sure it does." I replied. "Look carefully at your #2 VOR head. There's a glideslope needle in there!" Much to my surprise, this pilot/owner, who had received both is private and instrument training in this airplane at another flight school, had never experienced a real or simulated failure of his Garmin 430 GPS nav/com. Never having to use his #2 nav/com for a precision approach, he simply was not aware that his older style VOR head did, in fact, have a glideslope needle. Fail those instruments/Fail those systems! We all know Murphy's Law and it's many variations. In short, if something can go wrong, it will . . . and at the worst possible time. This certainly applies to aviation. Thus, our best defense against Mr. Murphy is to MAKE things go wrong during training sessions, then find ways around them. Engineered Redundancy There is an amazing level of engineered redundancy in today's aircraft. The rudder can serve the same purpose as ailerons; the throttle can replace the elevator; the airspeed indicator can replace the attitude indicator; the tachometer can replace the airspeed indicator; the heading indicator can replace the turn coordinator. There is, in fact, an infinite variety of substitutes for nearly every instrument and system onboard your airplane.
The key is to know instantly what can be replaced by what in an emergency. The only way to do that is to practice "failing" systems and instruments while in actual flight. Try it. You'll learn and have fun at the same time! A word about simulated instruments in IFR Conditions: Yikes! Failing instruments in IFR conditions. Who would EVER think of doing a thing like that? Truth is, instruments DO fail regardless of the weather outside. When it happens in IFR conditions, however, the risks escalate dramatically . . . and so does the pilot's anxiety level. Many flight instructors would never create a simulated partial panel condition when in IFR conditions. Others, depending upon their skill level, would not think twice about it. That is up to your instructor. As for me, yes . . . I'll place a sticky over the attitude indicator in IFR conditions. Sometimes I'll cover both the AI and the HI. If it is a glass cockpit airplane, I'll dim the primary flight display PFD (Avidyne) or paste a sheet of paper (Garmin) over the PFD in IFR conditions. Again, it is an individual instructor thing. Regardless, all IFR pilots must be proficient on partial panel in the clouds. How you get that way is up to you and your instructor.
Instrument pilots: If you spend enough time looking at instrument approach plates, you will soon notice some new and, perhaps, unfamiliar terms such as "GPS or RNP-0.3 required." See the text box below for the RNAV (GPS) Runway 25 approach to Jamestown, NY. Do you know what it means??
RNP is a navigation system that provides a specified level of accuracy defined by a lateral area of confined airspace in which RNP certified aircraft operate. RNP applies to navigation performance within a designated airspace, and includes the capability of both the available infrastructure (navigation aids) and the aircraft. To be more precise, RNP defines the total lateral and longitudinal system error permitted within a particular phase of flight or airspace. The flight profile below, for example, illustrates the navigation system errors, computation errors, display errors and flight technical errors, in nautical miles, that are permissible during 95% of the time spent in the departure, enroute, arrival, and approach phases of flight.
RNP levels are actual distances from the centerline of the flight path, which must be maintained for aircraft and obstacle separation. The United States currently supports three standard RNP levels:
Example . . . For
example, RNP 0.3 represents a distance of 0.3
nautical miles (NM) either side of a
At the present time, a 0.3 RNP level is the lowest level used in normal RNAV operations. Specific airlines, using special procedures, are approved to use RNP levels lower than RNP 0.3, but those levels are used only in accordance with their approved OpsSpecs. For aircraft equipment to qualify for a specific RNP type, it must be able to maintain navigational accuracy to within 95 percent of the total flight time.
There are four items every pilot needs close at hand when ATC issues holding instructions. They are (1) a pencil or pen; (2) piece of paper; (3) an enroute instrument chart; and (4) a skilled FO (first officer) to write down the instructions and then read them back accurately to the controller. Since most of us do not have item #4 (the FO), we better become skilled at doing all of this all by ourselves, and continue to fly the airplane while likely in instrument conditions. Today, holding is rare but you can expect it when weather problems are causing air traffic delays and re-routes.
Instrument flight can be made a whole lot easier if we pilots conscientiously attempt to anticipate every issued ATC clearance BEFORE it arrives. For example, if you are slugging along in instrument conditions and you hear other pilots being assigned to various holding fixes, it's a good bet you'll soon be receiving similar instructions. That's the time to pull out the enroute chart and to begin guessing where ATC might park you for several minutes or more. Know the Two Kinds of Holds There are basic two kinds of holds. The first is a charted holding pattern. It's hard to go wrong here. Simply fly to the fix, make the proper holding pattern entry, then fly it as depicted. See example below:
"...Hold southeast of PINNE
Intersection as published. Expect further clearance
at 1645."
A clearance for an uncharted holding pattern contains additional information: • Direction to hold from holding fix "...Hold west of Horst Intersection on Victor 8 5 mile legs left turns expect further clearance at 1430." What happens when your Expect Further Clearance (EFC) time approaches? There once was a time before we had nearly universal radar coverage where airplanes on IFR flight plans were separated by time. ATC used your last known fix, then crunched your filed airspeed and distance to travel numbers to arrive at your estimated time of arrival (ETA) at your next flight planned filed fix. Everything moved along nicely . . . that is, until somebody's radio failed. Not to worry, though . . . air traffic continued to move solely by reference to the clock. Now you know why a clock is a required instrument in IFR certified airplanes. Back to EFC . . . today, ATC almost always knows where you and everybody else is. Sure, there are still plenty of radar gaps throughout the United States. That is why, in part, we continue to file true airspeeds on our IFR flight plans and also why we still receive EFCs whenever entering a hold.
Answer: Do what you always do when in doubt about a clearance. Call ATC! Remind them that your EFC is quickly approaching. You will either be given a new EFC, or you will be cleared out of the hold and on to your next planned fix. Okay, what if you can't through? Radio failure? Perhaps. Whatever . . . If you cannot obtain an updated EFC or a revised clearance, time your remaining turn in the hold so as to depart the holding fix as close to your previously issued EFC as possible. Then continue along your previously approved flight planned route to your destination. What if your clearance limit is not an airport? Suppose, for some reason, ATC clears you to fix other than your destination airport. Clearance delivery advises that you can expect further clearance upon reaching that fix. You then proceed as filed. Enroute you lose contact with ATC (radio failure?). What do you do?
Using
the illustration below, assume you are eastbound on
V214 and the Cherrelyn VORTAC is your clearance
limit. If you have not been able to obtain
further clearance and have not
Important: If this holding pattern was not charted, you would hold west of the VOR on V214 using right-hand turns. Holding patterns are fun, challenging, and, unfortunately, seldom used anymore. But when they are (and you can certainly expect them on your instrument pilot check ride), be sure you know how they work! And don't forget those maximum holding speeds! In order to limit the amount of airspace that must be protected by ATC, maximum holding speeds in knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) have been designated for specific altitude ranges. Even so, some holding patterns may have additional speed restrictions to keep faster airplanes from flying out of the protected area. If a holding pattern has a nonstandard speed restriction, it will be depicted by an icon with the limiting airspeed. If the holding speed limit is less than you feel is necessary, you should advise ATC of your revised holding speed. Also, if your indicated airspeed exceeds the applicable maximum holding speed, ATC expects you to slow to the speed limit within three minutes of your ETA at the holding fix. Often pilots can avoid flying a holding pattern, or reduce the length of time spent in the holdingpattern, by slowing down on the way to the holding fix.
One final word about holding pattern entries. . . Many instrument instructors and Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) are sticklers for having us make the proper holding pattern entry, e.g., direct, parallel, and teardrop. The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) even paints nice little diagrams to help us properly find our way into holding patterns. The important thing is that you (1) meticulously maintain your assigned altitude in the hold; and (2) you turn in the direction specified. This will ensure that you remain clear of any obstacles on the non-holding side of the procedure.
I thought to myself how wonderful it would be to have another glass panel screen in my airplane capable of pulling up every FAA rule or regulation. That way, should I ever find myself in a hazardous flight scenario, the solution to my troubles would pop up on that screen and tell me precisely what to do! This online forum debate illustrated a major division that exists within the flight training community. On one side, we have the legalists. Legalists attempt to link every aviation foible to a violation of some FAA rule or regulation. They believe that if we create more rules and regulations, aviation foibles will decline. On the other side, we have pragmatists. Pragmatists accept FAA rules and regulations as the structure within which sound aeronautical decision making (ADM) occurs. They are, of course, to be obeyed, but they recognize that not every in-flight scenario is addressed by the regulations. Where do you stand? Where does the FAA stand?
He went on to point out that each accident is a result of something going wrong. A mechanical problem, a pilot skill or judgment error, a weather factor . . . whatever. "So how do we fix it," I asked? Here is where the conversation became a bit vague. "Ah . . . we could have more training, like the WINGs program and related safety seminars." No problem with that, I thought. Training is good. I pressed him further on this point. "Obviously we need more realistic training," he said. "But realism can be hazardous. But if we make it so restrictive, the day could come when the only truly safe flight occurs in simulators!"
The FAA's FITS program (FAA/Industry Training Standards) is an excellent example of this. FITS represents an entirely new way of teaching people how to fly. Rather than our traditional task-oriented training that is tied directly to the Practical Test Standards (PTS), FITS involves scenario-based training. Thus, instead of going out to the practice area and training somebody until he is able to pass an FAA checkride, students are taken on actual flight missions and into real scenarios. This is where they learn aeronautical decision making (ADM). How REAL should this training be? Here, again, my FAA friend made a very good point. He said, "Bob, when you train you bring along your many hours and years of flight experience. You understand your training airplane and the environment within which you are training." He added, "Not every instructor is as capable as you." "Point," I replied? "Well, as an instructor, you set a very high example for your students. What you do, they will do. What you say, they will say. The difficulty, then, is to create training scenarios where they can learn without encouraging them to go out and try it by themselves." My FAA friend is wise beyond his years, I thought to myself. He was pointing directly at the holy grail! "Therein lies the problem," I said. "Is it possible to teach a young driver how to remain safe on slippery highways without actually going out and driving on snowy days? Can we teach our children not to talk with strangers without actually taking them on a trip to the big city? If we do that, will we be encouraging them to do those things on their own?" "It depends," he replied. "Depends upon what," I asked? "It depends on the kind of judgment skills they have!" We ended our conversation in mutual agreement that the FARs cannot possibly cover all situations. Instead, they provide a broad framework within which we pilots must operate. Beyond that, we need to use our good judgment and skills to remain safe in the air!
New Cessna 182s, Columbia 400s, Cirrus models and lots of other aircraft are all coming out of the factory today are equipped with dual glass panels. Supporting these panels are massive databases containing more information than most pilots can possibly digest in a single flight. Similarly, older model airplanes are going in to be retro-fit with much of this same glass technology.
So what does this new technology give us? Since the glass provides us with approach charts, sectionals, low altitude enroute charts, SIDs, STARs, and whatever else the proficient pilot requires, do we still have to carry the same old paper charts and approach plates we've carried since the dawn of the Guttenberg printing press? Or does the new glass supplied information satisfy the requirements of FAR 91.103 (The need to have all available information)? Here is what the FAA has to say about paper charts:
Admittedly, the FAA's Instrument Procedures Handbook does not have the force of law. But it does provide excellent guidance for all of us operating in glass cockpits. Nowhere in the FARs does it say that sectionals, enroute charts, or other forms of paper information be in the airplane when we fly. All we have to go by is FAR 91.103. Here is another case where good, old-fashioned wisdom and aeronautical decision making (ADM) come into play. Keep the paper onboard!
Such "one-size-fits all" admonitions often gloss over the fact various flight risks range in severity from slight to extreme. This leaves the hapless pilot seriously under-prepared to consider, plan for, and deal with the very real and present threats to flight safety. The Risk of Deadly Airframe Icing is a Very Real Example . . . Discussions in recent past issues of "Over the Airwaves" and a related lengthy thread regarding known icing conditions on an online AOPA forum illustrates the wide spread existence of this "one-size-fits-all" belief system. This body of believers holds fast to a strict interpretation of the FARs with the full expectation that "by-the-book" flying will keep them out of trouble. Here's an example. Take a young pilot who could be the product of a "one-size-fits-all," by-the-book world of flight instruction. Somewhere along the line, he rejects the admonition to NEVER fly through sub-freezing clouds. His youthful bravado coupled with a very capable airplane and a compelling mission leads him willingly into very, very dangerous weather conditions and he and his passengers die in the process. In this instance, the pilot apparently rejected the notion that he should never fly in sub-freezing clouds. Unfortunately, his decision-making on this fatal flight suggests that, in rejecting this notion outright, he failed to understand that SOME freezing clouds CAN contain enough ice to bury him. His rejection of the notion that he should never fly in sub-freezing clouds was likely reinforced by hundreds of successful sub-freezing cloud penetrations earlier in his flying career. See the problem here?? See the problem. His possible "one-size-fits-all" flight training orientation may have forced him into an either "agree" or "disagree" option. In electing the latter, he failed to recognize that the issue is not "black and white" or "right or wrong." Instead, effective aeronautical decision making (ADM) is a complex process requiring careful analysis of all of the risk factors and a knowledgeable assessment of the factors contributing to those risks. The Actual Accident Scenario . . .
The weather on that fateful day was not good. Several witnesses in the vicinity of the accident site reported surface weather conditions varying from freezing rain to heavy snow. The National Weather Service Surface Analysis chart for 2300, January 11, 2005, showed a north-south stationary front positioned along the front range of the Rocky Mountains beginning at the Wyoming/Montana border and extending south into north-central Colorado.
The automated surface observation system (ASOS)
nearest the crash site reported the weather as a
broken ceiling at 1,100 feet above ground level
(agl), 1,800 feet agl broken, and 3,100 feet agl
overcast, visibility 2.5 statute miles (sm) with
light snow and mist, temperature 33 degrees
Fahrenheit (F), dew point 30 degrees F, winds
240 degrees at 3 knots, and altimeter 29.35
inches of mercury (in Hg). Extract from the NTSB Report:
Icing Risks Heightened Substantially by a Stationary Front and Existence of AIRMET ZULU (icing) along His Entire Route of Flight. This wasn't your typical sub-freezing cloud penetration with golden backdoors. The ceilings were low, visibility was poor, and freezing temperatures went right down to the surface. The reported presence of a stationary front foretold the existence of unstable air, possible temperature inversions, and lots of moisture. There were not many places this pilot could bolt to if he actually encountered airframe icing. Lastly, the entire of flight was blanked by AIRMET ZULU for moderate icing. He was in a corner before he even took off. Here is transcript of the final exchange between the pilot and the Flight Service Station specialist just before this fatal flight commenced:
This was no "one-size-fits-all" set of environmental conditions. There were far more risks on this day than simply sub-freezing clouds. Did this pilot have an understanding of the many different factors, in addition to sub-freezing clouds, that contributes to airframe icing? He certainly knew they were there, but did he understand them? As with all such accident reporting, we will never have all of the facts, nor will we know the the mindset of the accident pilot. We will never know, for example, if he rejected or accepted the "one-size-fits-all" admonition that all sub-freezing clouds contain "known ice." It appears that he rejected that notion. And did he really understand the full range of possible icing hazards? Remember, icing can be reported as "trace," "light," "moderate," or "severe." Icing is influenced by dew point temperatures, super-cooled water droplet size, stability of the surrounding air, all of which are considered when the National Weather Service issues aviation weather advisories. This entire matter of icing is certainly NOT compatible with a "one-size-fits-all" approach to sub-freezing clouds! In summary, if you DO accept and endorse this "one-size-fits-all" admonition regarding icing and that is ALL you know about icing, then I suggest you remain well clear of sub-freezing clouds at ALL times. On the other hand, if you reject this notion, be certain that you have a thorough understanding of what you are doing, where your back doors are, and your aircraft's capability before venturing into sub-freezing clouds, FARs notwithstanding! You can get hurt or worse by flying into cold clouds. And if you do, the tragedy will be further worsened by the insults you will experience (if you survive) resulting from enforcement actions taken against your certificates by the FAA, beginning with a violation of FAR 91. 13 (careless and reckless operation).
With "Over the Airwaves" now going to thousands of readers around the world, I am intrigued by much of the e-mail feedback I receive. Regrettably, much of this e-mail reads like the message, quoted above, that came in this past week. The scenario is nearly always the same. An individual signs up for private pilot lessons. He or she goes through a parade of flight instructors, many of whom "use" the student to build their own logbook hours for that cherished "real" flying job. About one-half way through the curriculum, somebody in the flight school examines the student's log book and concludes that the excessive number dual instructional hours must be indicative of that student's defective flying skills. So labeled, the student is recycled through each element the curriculum until the student quits in despair! Need proof? It is estimated that more than one-half of all primary flight students quit before checkride! Flight training is expensive. With instructor and aircraft rental, the hourly rate easily exceeds $140/hour. Assuming the student does his or her part, the private pilot curriculum should take no more than 35 hours of dual instruction and 20 hours of solo to complete. That is 55 hours total. Figuring all costs, that should total about $7,000. The instrument curriculum typically runs just a little bit longer - maybe 65 hours and $8,000. Because of this high expense, flight schools and independent flight instructors have a professional obligation to conduct the required training in an effective and efficient fashion. Their professional obligation to a flight student is no different than that of a physician in treating a patient. If the student failed to learn, it's because the instructor or flight school failed to teach . . . or inspire or motivate! If I hear one more instructor or flight school representative blame a flight student for his or her failure to achieve a desired rating, I'm going to (pardon me) . . . . well, let's just say that it won't be pretty. Sure, there are exceptions, like a student's illness, job transfer or even loss of a job, but those are rare. In my opinion, flight students fail to achieve their desired rating in most cases because of one or more shortcomings in the instructional process. The sooner we all realize this, the sooner something can be done about it.
Message to OTA Readers . . . Your numbers are increasing dramatically. Therefore YOU can help to remove the shortcomings in our flight training process. If you or somebody you know is NOT being adequately served by their flight school or independent flight instructor, put that school or CFI on notice that you are NOT pleased. If they show a willing desire to fix the problem, fine. Hopefully, the problem will go away.
Hopefully in the process of doing this the defective flight schools and independent flight instructors will fade away into the sunset. The good news is . . . There are hundreds of high quality flight schools and and thousands of independent flight instructors throughout the United States. They are known by the testimonies of their graduating flight students. And some of the best, most talented flight instructors are young people fresh out of training themselves. They are armed with a strong base of knowledge and the zeal to get it across to their students. What they lack in experience, they make up in talent, enthusiasm, and effective interpersonal skills. The bad news is . . . Unfortunately, however, there are flight schools and independent flight instructors who are NOT getting the job done correctly and efficiently. They are staffed by "time-building" instructors who would rather fly midnight freight runs in tired Cessna 310s and Caravans than teach others how to fly. The sooner these marginal flight training resources are identified and removed from the system, the sooner our pilot ranks will swell and the sooner our safety record will improve.
What NOT to Expect from your Flight
Instructor!
In summary, flight instruction is a lot like medicine and surgery. The outcomes are far too important to be cavalier about your selection of providers.
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Over the Airwaves
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thought, enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to encourage the
strong pilot, and to disturb the weaker pilot. With this
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Nobody
is watching all of this any closer than our
aircraft insurance carriers. Aircraft
insurance was once regarded as simply
another line item in the indirect cost
category of an aircraft owner's financials.
Today, this same insurance expense is
quickly becoming the number one
consideration when determining if you can
afford to own an airplane!
The
only way serious change can take place is
through us . . . the general aviation
pilots. 
Keep
the airspeed indicator in your scan
Fortunately,
it does not happen very often anymore. Today's solid
state aircraft radios are nearly bullet proof. Things
that do fail, however, are power and antenna connections and
occasionally a headset or microphone malfunction. 
In
some aircraft, a failed alternator is not easy to detect.
There may be no "low voltage" warning light. The
ammeter may not be in your instrument scan. Without a
working alternator, most aircraft batteries last less than
30 minutes. Note: Your
radios require more electrical power to transmit than to
receive. So you could be hearing radio calls but you
are unable to transmit.
Regrettably,
there may be no Plan B. Your radios are toast.
If flying VFR, no big deal. Land as soon as
practicable to check things out. Sure, you can squawk 7,600
if you like. It will capture ATC's attention, but
there is little they can do for you other than to clear
traffic out of your path. 
Here's
the scenario. Sally takes off from the Richmond,
Virginia Airport on an IFR plan via low altitude airways to
Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. Her cleared route of
flight will take her over Dulles Airport through Washington,
DC ADIZ, over Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City and
through Boston's airspace for her descent into the Vineyard.
It is a rainy Friday night, solid IFR along the entire
route.
By now, ATC is well aware of Sally's
predicament. Wishing that she would find her way back
out of the system, they begin to clear traffic away from her
path along the entire eastern seaboard just as the Friday
night evening push is underway. 
What
is RNP?
specified
flight path centerline. The
specific performance
that is required on the final approach segment of an
instrument approach is an example of this RNP level.
Anticipate
the Controller's Next Call!
You
are now spinning around in the hold and note that
your EFC time is only five minutes away and you have
not received another clearance. What do you
do?
received
holding instructions, you should plan to hold
southwest on the 221° radial using left-hand turns,
as depicted. 
I
was deep in debate on AOPA's online forum
recently. One particular poster skillfully
developed his points by referencing various
FARs, the Aeronautical Information Manual,
Aviation Circulars, and even court rulings.
I
had a telephone conversation last week with a
respected member of our local FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO) on this very
question. He made a convincing point when
he said, "I am involved in nearly every
general aviation accident investigation that
occurs in our region. What surprises me
most is the fact that less than 50 percent of
these accidents involve any violation of the
regulations!"
He
made another very convincing point!
Training to be effective must be real, relevant,
and safe. 
Keeping
the electronic databases necessary to support
all of this glass is not cheap. Annual
database subscriptions for the necessary
software updates can easily exceed $2,000 a
year. 
If
we are not careful, a "one-size-fits" all
mentality to flight training can seriously
impede the development of required pilot skills.
Examples of this include safety admonitions that
say: (1) never fly through sub-freezing clouds;
(2) never fly in winds exceeding the crosswind
capability of your aircraft; (3) never fly when
thunderstorms are in the forecast, and (4) never
fly a single engine airplane in night IFR
conditions.
On
January 11, 2005, a 35 year old ATP took off
from Steamboat Springs, CO in a twin engine
Beech BE-90 King Air. He was on an
aeromedical evacuation mission to transport an
automobile accident victim from a hospital near
Rawlins, Wyoming.
Or
as one participant on an aviation forum recently
posted: 
If,
on the other hand, you receive little or no
satisfaction, BAIL OUT! Run, don't
walk to another flight school or independent
flight instructor in or near your community.
Don't worry . . . any instructional hours you
received from your parting flight school are 100
percent transferable to any other flight school.
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