The hangar flying was becoming lively.  We were discussing the relative merits of the Columbia 400 and the Cirrus SR22.  Praises were being heaped upon each of these fine airplane designs.  One of our members stepped forward and boldly proclaimed the best of the two. "I'll take the Cirrus SR22 hands down," he said!

"Why," I asked? 

"It's the chute, of course," came his instant reply. "If things get tough, we can always pull the handle!"

I pondered his observation and this man's flying skills.  He is a very low time private pilot without an instrument rating. What a dangerous mindset, I thought.  Here is a pilot who appears to be placing more importance on the presence of an aircraft ballistic recovery system parachute than upon acquiring the skills necessary to prevent its use in the first place.

President Lyndon Johnson once acknowledged that while in office he was the most powerful man on the planet.  After all, he had the hydrogen bomb and the button to set it off.  He said, however, "Pushing that button was never an option.  Therefore, how much power did I really have?  Not very much!"

Thankfully, President Johnson and our other world leaders had enough diplomatic skills and economic resources to preclude the need to push the nuclear button.  They realized that if that button was ever pushed, all bets were off. The world as they knew it could suddenly come to an end.

We pilots are being introduced to another kind of button . . . actually a handle at the top of our cockpits.  It's called an aircraft ballistic recovery parachute that, when activated, promises to allow our disabled airplane to descend safely to the ground.  Leastwise, that's the word going around hangars all across America.

Having a ballistic aircraft parachute is good if . . .

There are only three scenarios that I can think of where having a ballistic parachute would be truly beneficial.  The first scenario would be a catastrophic airframe failure such as caused by a mid-air collision.

The second scenario would be an engine failure in IMC at night over extremely hostile terrain or open water out of glide range from shore. 

The third scenario would be when a poorly trained, non-proficient pilot blunders into life threatening circumstance that causes his undisciplined brain to freeze at the controls.  He either dies or pulls the handle.

There is no other justification for having a ballistic chute, in my opinion.  I would much rather depend upon "heads up" flying and other technology to avoid a mid-air collision in the first place.  Engine failure?  With enough altitude and a moving map GPS, chances are one could reach an airport or a four lane highway, leastwise here in the east. 

As for blundering into life threatening circumstances that causes one's brain to freeze, well . . .   let's just say that proper training and well practiced flight proficiency is a much, much better solution.

Don't get me wrong.  I'm not bashing the Cirrus SR22 nor its ballistic recovery system.  It has saved lives!  Cirrus Design as come up with a great airplane.   I teach in an SR22, oftentimes over hostile terrain at night.  At times like that, I'm glad to have the chute.  It certainly represents the latest in back door options for the general aviation pilot. 

What I am bashing, however, is the subtle shift we see occurring in the flight training community to build reliance upon technology at the expense of piloting skills to save our bacon when the chips are down. 

Remember, this is the first and only technology that, when exercised, intentionally causes a $400,000 airplane to crash and likely be destroyed with possible injuries to crew and passengers.  Keep in mind that the chute provides no guarantees.  There are clearly instances where the chute hasn't worked, e.g., low altitude and/or excessive speed deployments.  Engineers tell us that hitting the ground with a properly deployed ballistic recovery chute is equivalent to a 15 foot fall.

The real danger comes when we see flight schools replacing training fleets with ballistic chute equipped trainers presumably to provide student pilots and inexperienced flight instructors with the ability to "pull the handle" to save the day.  Could they be saying, in effect, that it is more cost effective to skip over critical piloting skills development and, instead, equip our training airplanes with parachutes?  Remember, some of these young pilots will one day migrate to the cockpits of large Boeings and Airbuses.  No parachutes there!

The other side of the argument . . .

As I write this article a light suddenly flashes in my brain.  Could it be that Cirrus Design is really on to something here?  Do they know something that the FAA likely already knows?  Have they come to the same conclusion that we have been preaching here in "Over the Airwaves" for the past two years?  Do they believe that the typical GA pilot graduating from the typical flight training program today and who just meets the minimally required recurrent training requirements is NOT capable of flying safely without some sort of "save the day" technology?

Fly safe! Bob Miller, ATP, MCFI Master Certificated Flight Instructor Buffalo, NY rjma@rjma.com 716-864-8100

The controller cleared the Piper Lance as follows, "Lance xxxx, make short approach runway two niner right, cleared to land."  

The controller added, "We're getting a little bit of a tailwind now use caution. Its ah one two zero at one zero."  The pilot acknowledged the landing clearance.

The pilot of a Cessna waiting to depart the airport observed the Lance making a low, wide, turn to final for runway 29R.  He further reported that the airplane overshot the runway and continued to turn back towards the runway.

According to another witness, the Lance was observed overhead, "teetering back and forth."  This witness observed the airplane bank "hard" towards the west, as if to line up with the runway. The witness lost sight of the airplane; however, he heard both the sound of an engine "revving" or increasing in rpm, and the sound of a crash. Shortly thereafter, the witness observed two balls of fire, one approximately 30 seconds after the initial ball of fire.

An Experienced Pilot at the Controls!

The accident pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine privileges and type ratings for DC-3, DC-6, DC-7, DC-8, DC-10, B727 and B747 aircraft. In addition, he held a commercial pilot certificate with single engine airplane land and sea privileges.

According to photocopies of the pilot's logbook, he had logged approximately 100 hours in the PA-32RT-300 over the past 5 years. The pilot had logged 11 hours in the past 90 days in the accident airplane. Insurance records indicate the pilot had approximately 180 hours total time in the PA-32RT-300. These records indicated that the pilot had logged approximately 25,900 total hours.  He had a current medical.

Bad Things Happen to Good Pilots, Too . . .

Here we have a very high time airline pilot who is getting up there in years (age 78).  He's complied with all of the necessary currency requirements.  He is at home in an airplane as anybody else out there.

He's following all of the rules.  The tower makes a special request and asks if he can make a short approach from the downwind leg.  The NTSB report does not say why the tower cleared him to Runway 29R when the prevailing winds were more in line with Runway 11L, but it was noted that winds were variable at the time of the accident.  It was noted that the ATIS recording was updated after the accident to ATIS Sierra to reflect the wind and a change in active runway to 11L.

The Pilot had a Decision to Make

Noting the wind direction reported by the ATIS as well as the controllers comment regarding ". . . a little bit of tailwind," the pilot had two choices.  He could refuse the landing clearance to Runway 29R and request a more favorable runway. Or, after considering the winds, we could elect to accept a downwind landing.  He chose the latter, obviously with a little nudging from the controller.

In accepting the landing clearance to Runway 29R with winds from 160 degrees, the pilot had to know that his turn from the downwind leg to the final approach leg would be tight due to the tailwind.  This problem was seriously compounded by the controller's request to make a short approach (remember, most controllers are not pilots!) 

A Formula for a Fatal Stall/Spin Accident in the Pattern!

Anybody who has received spin training realizes the risky position this pilot was quickly finding himself in.  He was low, slow, and making tight turns.  The southeasterly winds helped to push him through the final approach course. 

He needed to tighten his turn as he may have pitched up to maintain altitude while trying to align himself with the runway.  Perhaps he applied a little too much left rudder in the process.  The airplane began skidding around the turn.  Then, as witnesses observed and reported, the airplane "teetering back and forth" then banked "hard" to the west. 

Lessons Learned from this fatal accident . . .

Not surprisingly, I received numerous emails regarding the alternator failure reported in the previous issue of "Over the Airwaves."  Readers wanted to know why safety wired bolts holding the alternator housing together mysteriously came loose.  Good questions, all!

We do not know why they came loose other than as a result of a faulty alternator assembly in the first place.  But what this experience does teach us is the need for a periodic comprehensive owner/operator inspection of the engine compartment.  This inspection requires the owner/operator to use his or her fingers to actually touch and attempt to twist, turn, and tighten every possible component, fitting, hose, nut, bolt, or bracket he can reach.

I do not mean taking a screw driver and wrench and go poking around things he doesn't understand;  rather, with fingers (yes, get them dirty), he should periodically examine the engine compartment as thoroughly as he should be checking his own body parts for lumps, bumps, or other anomalies.   In our alternator failure incident, early detection of the faulty alternator assembly as evidenced by chaffing safety wire may have prevented our emergency landing.

Do it at oil change time!

I am an aircraft owner but I do not change my own oil.  Instead, I regard my 50 hour oil changes in the same context as I do personal annual physicals with my family physician.  Sure, I could pull the plug, replace the oil filter, and pour fresh oil down the big gray hole in the top of my engine.  I'd even save a few bucks by doing this myself.

I am not a skilled aircraft mechanic.  That's why I have my personal aircraft physician do it for me.  But I am always at his side when he does it.  I look, probe, feel, wipe, twist, touch, and ask lots of questions.  Together, we explore every fitting, hose, probe, and engine component and accessory as thoroughly as my pilot friend and physician, Mark Weissman, MD, performs his work in the clinic.  Nothing escapes our watchful eyes!

Going to the Lab . . .

Again, like Dr. Weissman's work, we go beyond physical exploration of our engine compartment. We do lab work as well.  In our case, we capture and send several ounces of drained oil to the laboratory for spectrographic analysis.  If anything is amiss in the combustion process, it will likely show up in the oil. For example, an unusually high presence of silicone in a recent oil analysis revealed that I had failed to change the air filter at its regularly scheduled interval.

We also cut open and carefully examine the contents of the used oil filter.  Any metal particles found in the pleated folds of filter paper can be the first sign of a cylinder about to self-destruct. 

Trust but verify

I am fortunate to fly under the watchful care of two highly professional and very talented aircraft mechanics.  One is Kevin Rose of Rose Aviation at the Akron Airport in Akron, NY.  Kevin cares for the training aircraft I use.  He can hear things inside an aircraft engine that we normal mortals could never hear.  The other is Kirby McCall, chief mechanic at Dunkirk Aviation in Dunkirk, NY.  Kirby maintains my 1980 turbo Cessna 210.   Kirby has a pathological attention to detail.

Regardless of the talents of each of these two aircraft maintenance professionals, I like to stand over their shoulders as they work.  The best part of this practice is that I learn more about the inner workings of the airplanes I fly.  It also gives me an opportunity to look for trouble spots under the cowling that even they might one day miss.

Besides, Kevin and Kirby are smart guys.  I'm always hoping that some of their mechanical talent will rub off on me!

I was motoring along recently with a pilot who is wrapping up his commercial rating with me.  He was responding to ATC radio calls with a bit more verbiage than necessary.  For example, when the TRACON controller called and said, "Nxxx, contact Niagara tower on 118.5,"  he replied with, "Nxxxx, switching to Niagara tower on 118.5."

"No big deal," I told him, "but as an commercial pilot you want your radio work to be short and crisp.  For example when the controller tells you to switch to the Niagara tower on 118.5, simply reply with the numbers, e.g., 118.5, Nxxxx."

Keeping it short and to the point . . .

Few things frustrate professional pilots more than waiting for a long-winded pilot attempt to read back every word of every call a controller makes.  At a minimum, it ties up the frequency. 

The controller's job is to keep the system moving without allowing airplanes to run into each other.  Our job is to acknowledge that we have received the pertinent portions of each controller call.  Those pertinent portions are typically just the numbers such as altitude, headings, and frequencies and, of course, our a/c call signs. 

Remember, when on the ground we are required to read back all hold short instructions.  For example, "Nxxx, taxi via Kilo, cross Runway 14, left on Delta, hold short of Runway 23 on Delta."  Our reply would be, "Hold short Runway 23, Delta, Nxxxx."

Study the pros . . .

You can sit at home and listen to live transmissions of professional pilots and controllers engage in crisp and concise exchanges by jumping over to Live ATC.Net.  Leave this audio feed run in the background as you continue your reading of "Over the Airwaves."

There is a strange paradox going on at my home airport in Akron, NY like so many other airports around the nation.  When the weather is bright and sunny and the winds are light and variable, there always seems to be several airplanes in pattern practicing landings and takeoffs.  Curiously, however, when the gusts kick up a bit or when that challenging northwest wind descends upon the airport, the pattern becomes strangely quiet. 

Most of us are pretty good at calm wind landings and takeoffs.  That's why we like to practice them.  We feel good and those observing us marvel at our smooth techniques.  It's understandable, then, why we often pack it up when the winds are not right down the runway. 

Good practice for the Sunday flyer . . .

There is nothing wrong with limiting one's flying to calm winds and sunny days . . . if that is all your flying missions ever call for.  Like any good ultralight or balloon pilot, waiting for calm winds is the key to a long life as an aviator.

For those who use their airplanes for cross-country flight, however, waiting for calm winds may not always be practicable.  We can certainly wait for calm winds before we depart.  What we find at our destination, however, could be totally different than what was forecast.  Or, we may discover that our planned destination runway is unexpectedly closed.  It is then that we wished our crosswind technique was better perfected.

Find that which you are most weak . . . then practice more of it!

For most of us, crosswind takeoffs and landings are among our weakest maneuvering skills.  Why?  Because everybody from our primary flight instructor to tower controllers across America encourage us to always use the most wind-favorable runway.  It is sort of like "apple pie and motherhood!"

I sometimes marvel at the responses I receive from approach and tower controllers when I request a runway 32 when winds are from the southwest at 10 knots with gusts to 15.   Controllers typically reply with, "Ah . . . N4720Y . . . ah . . . runway 23 is available!"

"No thanks, just practicing," I quickly reply.  It's like the tower folks almost never hear a request for the least wind-favorable runway, particularly when the winds are high and gusty.  Try it.  See how your tower controllers reply!  Find airports in your area whose runways are not aligned with the winds.  Make it a point to go there and practice your crosswind techniques.  If you are not current or proficient with crosswind operation, go with an experienced CFI.

Practicing good crosswind takeoff technique . . .

Like everything else we do in aviation, it's best to begin with an experienced flight instructor.  NTSB reports are filled with accounts of gusty landing and takeoff accidents involving low time pilots and inexperienced flight instructors. 

You can actually practice crosswind takeoffs in calm wind conditions.   As you taxi onto the active runway, pretend that a 20 knot crosswind is coming from the left.  Before you begin the takeoff roll, roll in full left aileron.  Use your rudder pedals to maintain runway alignment.  As your ground roll speed increases, slowly begin to neutralize the ailerons, again maintaining runway alignment with your feet.  Once airborne, level the wings and adjust your rudder input to achieve coordinated (ball centered) flight.  See the illustration below.  

After you become proficient with this technique in calm winds, apply the same technique in actual crosswind takeoffs.  Remember, of course, to keep the upwind wing banked into the wind from the commencement of the takeoff roll.  Then, slowly decrease the bank angle as you increase your takeoff roll speed.  We call this "leaning" into the wind.

There are two reasons for "leaning" into the wind on crosswind takeoffs (and landings).  The first is to correct for heading drift caused by the crosswind.   The second is to prevent crosswind gusts from getting under the upwind wing and upsetting the aircraft.

Practice, Practice, and More Practice . . .

I frequently remind my flight students that crosswind takeoffs and landings are more the norm than the exception.  Runways are oriented in only two directions.  Winds come from all 360 points on the compass.  From a statistical probability perspective, you can ALWAYS expect some form of crosswind.  This being the case, it is in everybody's best interest to practice them often and practice them aggressively.  

Note:  Pilots should understand the meaning of the "maximum demonstrated crosswind speed" recorded in their aircraft POH.  It is a statement of fact that their airplane was safely test flown at that stated speed.  It is neither an operational nor legal limiting crosswind speed.  In the hands of a proficient pilot, your aircraft can likely takeoff and/or land in higher crosswinds.  That being said, however, pilots should always limit their crosswind operations to the level of their own personal skill and proficiency.

The story of aviation's first 100 years is made up of many remarkable people, from the best-known aviation personalities to thousands of unheralded people who contributed to the development of aviation in their local communities.

Times have changed since many of us first learned to fly.  In those early days, we relied solely upon an extensive conversation with a flight service station (FSS) briefer to relay over the telephone information coming to him from the National Weather Service.

Today, we have access to most of this very same information on our home computers.  And given the fact that weather factors contribute to more aviation accidents than any other cause, having immediate access to this weather information is a very good thing.

Become a Web Weather Power User!

It is one thing to have the wx information available.  It is quite another to use it effectively.  The first place to begin is to explore the many aviation weather sites on the web.  Next, create a directory of "favorites" on your computer's web browser.  Lastly, learn to read and interpret each weather site.  Compare the information supplied in one site with information coming to you from another site.

Here are a few sites I look at before commencing a flight:

I insist that each of my flight students become web weather power users.  Their study of the weather begins the day before each schedule training flight.  Using the Surface Analysis looping chart" (click HERE), students are able to show me what the weather across the continent has been doing over the previous 24 hours. 

From there, students review the "Surface Prognosis charts" (click HERE).  These charts reveal the all important position of any LOWs and/or frontal activity along our planned training route.  Pilots know that low pressure areas and warm fronts in the wintertime around the Great Lakes can spell real trouble.  Their position relative to our planned training area helps us to determine the risk of icing in freezing clouds.

Nobody should ever depart, of course, without first checking NOTAMS and Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs). 

Cell Phone and Blackberry Weather

For pilots who carry web accessible cell phones or Blackberry's (which all pilots should!), you can quickly download many FREE aviation weather reports.  One free URL that I use on my Blackberry is http://206.183.1.150.  This, of course, works on web accessible cell phones as well.  And it is FREE!

DUATs (click HERE) is a wonderful tool in the hands of both VFR and IFR web weather power users.  A quick click on the DUATs link gives you access to a wealth of weather information.  It offers the added benefit of being able to instantly file your VFR or IFR flight plan.

AOPA offers a more colorful and graphically rich site to file your flight plans as well (click HERE).  You not only access weather information and file your flight plan, you also receive route maps from your departure point to your destination.  Great stuff!

There still is nothing like talking with a professional FSS weather briefer.  These fine folks have more information at their finger tips than we could possibly acquire on the Web.  Therefore, it is best to use both resources prior to making a flight.  First go through the various Web pages for weather and TFR information.  This provides you with the big picture.  Armed with this information, give FSS a call before your depart.

We all know that FSSs are in a transition.  Nobody really knows how the new plan will work out.  Whichever way it goes, trust these fine folks to give you the best information possible.

Lastly, Remember FAR 91.103!!!

Pilots are required to have ALL available information before commencing flight.  Having weather and NOTAM/TFR information is a large part of this requirement.  In the unlikely event of accident or mishap, you must be able to PROVE that you, indeed, received a weather briefing. 

The only two ways to have this proof is to use either DUATS (directly or via AOPA or other flight planning program) or by calling Flight Service.   While using other web sites is useful, they do not provide proof that you received a weather briefing.  Keep that in mind! 

We are well aware of the tragic fact that most fatal weather related accidents are caused by inadvertent VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).  Curiously, the data also suggests that it matters little whether or not you have an instrument rating!  Yep . . . instrument rated pilots also die from inadvertent IMC penetration. 

No meteorological event takes more pilot lives than the sudden loss of an outside horizon!  A pilot may be flying along wings level in visual conditions.  He enters the clouds and instantly loses total control of the airplane.   The airplane, of course, does not know it is in the clouds.  Only the pilot knows this.  And with this knowledge, his mind suddenly freezes.  Panic interrupts his basic thought patterns. 

What moments earlier appeared as an orderly array of instruments now takes on the appearance of total confusion.  The sounds of the cockpit change.  Wind noises increase.  His body begins to sense strange forces.  The hands on the instruments begin turning, some up and some down.  Cold sweat drips down the back of his neck.  He struggles for rationality.  Nothing computes correctly.  Within less than a minute his airplane is no longer recoverable.  At 6,500 feet AGL, he has less than three minutes to live.

Many IFR rated pilots have long ago lost their instrument ability!

Advanced pilot ratings are like aircraft batteries.  Unless frequently recharged, rating skills quickly lose their effectiveness.  This is particularly true with the instrument rating.  The mental crispness and precise maneuvering skills required to fly solely by reference to instruments are very fragile.  You use them or you lose them . . . Surprisingly, IFR skills begin to diminish within two weeks or so from the previous IFR flight! 

Based upon the many IPCs (instrument proficiency checks) that I have done, pilots who have been off the gauges for more than a couple of months exhibit a sharp decline in their their IFR proficiency.

Legally-deceptive currency . . .

Of all the federal aviation regulations, there is none so deceptively understated as FAR 61.57.

FAR 61.57 is not enough . . . if you want to survive on the gauges!

Remembering that nearly as many instrument rated pilots die in the clouds as non-instrument rated pilots, we must come to grips with the fact that FAR 61.57 is a dangerously understated IFR currency requirement.  It would be laughable if it were not so tragic!  Any instrument rated pilot who believes that he can maneuver safely in the clouds by minimally complying with FAR 61.57 will likely become a sad GA statistic.

Worse, any pilot who believes he can maintain instrument proficiency in simulated (under the hood or in a stationary flight simulator) conditions will likely also become a sad statistic.  For the record, simulated conditions are great for learning IFR procedures.  They do not, however, impart nor maintain the skills necessary to remain upright in actual IFR conditions - particularly in high workload settings.

I have flown repeatedly with instrument rated pilots who received nearly all of their IFR training in simulated conditions.  When I bring them into actual instrument conditions, place them in unusual attitudes, and add a bit of additional workload to their flying tasks, none of these pilots were able to safely recover.  None, no, not one!  Without a qualified instructor by their side, they would have surely died!

Why?  These simulated trained IFR pilots had not yet learned to discern and react properly to the difference between what their instruments were telling them and what their body was telling them.  Without this practice-induced discernment, they do what their (rotating) body (inner ear) tells them to do . . . and they lose control of the airplane - every time!   

The problem worsens dramatically when the workload suddenly increases.  What may be regarded as a leisurely flight through smooth, stratus clouds by a low time or non-current instrument pilot quickly becomes a nightmare when things start going wrong.  Distracted by ice accumulating on the wings, moderate turbulence, or a glowing annunciator light, the once-in-control pilot easily becomes rattled.  Diverting his attention from the gauges for only seconds results in an unusual attitude . . . then all bets are off. 

Time to get down and dirty in the clouds . . .

There is only one way to become proficient in actual IFR conditions.   That is, fly often in IFR conditions.  Not only fly often in IFR conditions, but go up with an experienced instrument instructor and, under the proper conditions described below, practice unusual IFR attitudes in the clouds.  These attitudes are not extreme.  They include 45 degree banked turns and slow flight. Again, if you are not proficient in the clouds don't attempt this without an experienced instrument instructor on board!

Here's a suggestion.  Choose an IFR day where you have at least 3,000 feet of good VFR conditions below.  Secure a block altitude IFR clearance that spans both the IFR and VFR conditions.  The VFR conditions immediately below provides you with a back door should your IFR unusual attitude exercise not go as planned.  Climb no more than 100 feet or so into the clouds and begin your maneuvers. One more time.  Don't attempt this exercise without an experienced instrument instructor on board and good VFR below!  And, as always, check your POH before performing any maneuvers.

Some instructors reading this may strongly object to any form of unusual attitude training in IFR conditions, suggesting that simulated conditions, e.g., view limiting device or stationary flight simulator, be used instead.   Unfortunately, such simulations cannot realistically duplicate the body sensations experienced inside the clouds.  Until they develop a "peek-proof" hood, there are no other options other than a full motion airline-type simulator.

Note to instrument flight instructors:  Obviously, before you begin teaching unusual attitude recoveries in IFR conditions, be certain that you are proficient in these maneuvers.  This is where recurrent training involving aerobatics and emergency maneuvers recovery training is extremely valuable.  An excellent source for this can be found HERE.

This scenario is pieced together from preliminary statements issued by the NTSB, local newspaper accounts, and PIREPs filed by the accident pilot.  Its reporting here is intended for instructional purposes only. 

In this scenario, a high time pilot with CFI and ATP ratings boarded the Cirrus SR22 along with two passengers.  According to an NTSB spokesman, the airplane entered the clouds at an altitude of 5,000 feet.  While climbing through 7,700 feet reports say that the airplane encountered severe ice.  At about 9,000 feet, while continuing the climb in the clouds, the airplane began to buffet then followed with a spin to the left.  The pilot reduced power and applied opposite rudder, but the aircraft did not respond. The pilot then informed ATC that he was pulling the aircraft's ballistic parachute.

During these events, the pilot filed the following urgent pilot report (PIREP):

What went wrong here?

As with most such accidents, nobody really knows what was going on inside the cockpit or inside the pilot's head during the events leading up to the accident.  But we can piece together what likely may have been the circumstances surrounding the accident.  From these pieces, we can find instructional value.

According to the above referenced sources, the Cirrus SR22 climbed up into a 5000' cloud base.  According to the pilot's issued PIREP, he encountered severe icing as he passed through 7,700' on the way up to 9,000'.  The aircraft had no ice protection equipment.  At 9,000 feet, he lost control of the airplane, pulled the ballistic recovery chute and floated safely to the ground.  All three walked away from the crash unhurt.

Again, we weren't there, but one might reasonably ask why the pilot, upon his first encounter with severe icing at 7,700', did not begin a quick descent back down to waiting VFR conditions just a couple thousand feet below?  The facts of the case strongly suggest that the clouds were ice-free up to the 7,700' point. 

Again, I emphasize that not being in the cockpit with the pilot nor discussing the event afterwards, we have no way of knowing if other factors were at work here.  But absent such factors, this is a case where a better decision may have been to descend rather than to continue climbing through severe icing conditions. Such action could have prevented the need to pull the ballistic recovery chute, risk lives in the process, and ultimately wreck an otherwise perfectly good airplane.

The pilot did do the right thing!

Given the circumstances that the pilot found himself in (loaded down with ice, stalled, then spinning), the pilot did the right thing.  He pulled the chute and the lives of all aboard were saved.  Credit certainly goes to the ballistic recovery system here.  But we have to, again, wonder how the pilot got himself into this predicament in the first place?

There is probably no more misunderstood, more controversial, and more debated aviation topic among general aviation pilots than the matter of known icing.  As evidence of this controversy, you may wish to jump over to the AOPA forums and review a thread titled "Over the Airways Good Article About Electrical Failure in a Cirrus." 

What began as a complimentary reference to an article I wrote in the last OTA issue quickly broke down into a heated discussion about whether my flight instructing behavior was appropriate given the presence of icing conditions. Rather than re-hash the contents of this diatribe, let me simply say that it points directly to the enormous extent of misinformation regarding icing and legalities of flying in and around it.

The central point of this mis-information originated from a CFI/FAA Safety Counselor who insisted that, "Anyone who enters a cloud having a temperature of less than 32d F. has entered known icing conditions." 

Another CFI poster became quite enraged regarding my description of our recent Cirrus SR22 training approach to the Elmira, NY Airport.  He insisted that since we had encountered light ice on the descent into above-freezing temperatures at the airport, we should have landed parked the airplane and taken a rental car home.  In reality, after checking the weather and confirming that there was no icing reports nor was their icing in the forecast to the west, we flew a missed approach, climbed back up through a 1,500' ice free cloud layer to clear skies above, and continued west to our next destination.

In other words, the poster strenuously argued that since we encountered light ice 30 miles northeast of the airport, that known ice would therefore be present to the west of the airport.  Thus, he insisted, I broke the known icing rules and should have landed and ended the training mission right there. 

He further impugned my integrity as a flight instructor and suggested that I ought not be writing such things on public forums where the FAA might find out and snatch my pilot's certificate!  Besides, "It sets a bad example for your flight students," he said. 

Lastly, my detractors argued that had we been in a "known ice certified airplane," everything would have been okay.

So was I right or wrong?

First of all, we need to clear up the first misconception.  The simple presence of clouds with temperatures below freezing does NOT constitute "known icing" as this posting CFI/FAA Safety Counselor insists.  If that were the case, general aviation, including most Part 135 operations, would come to a grinding halt in the northern half of the United States from November through April.  

FAA inspectors would have a field day standing on FBO ramps here in the north with thermometers in hand on cloudy days handing out violations.  And all those pilots spending $27,000 or more dollars to have TKS anti-icing systems on their airplanes would be doing so to deliberately violate FAR 91.527 (Prohibition of flight into known icing conditions).

Here is what the courts have had to say about known icing . . .

For known icing to exist, it must either be reported OR it must be in the weather forecasts.   It does not exist simply because cloud temperatures are below 32d F!  Instead, the formation of airframe ice requires a unique combination temperature, dew point temperature, water droplet size, and atmospheric instability factors to occur.  That is why icing AIRMETs and SIGMETs cover some areas of below-freezing clouds and not others.

There were neither reports of icing nor was icing in the forecast for our planned and executed missed approach to the west of the Elmira Airport, hence no rules were broken and no risks were encountered. 

Why Pilots Continue to Die in Icing Conditions!

There is no question that icing is a very dangerous weather phenomenon.  It has the power to bring down airliners.  Be that as it may, however, we as flight instructors should not be so fearful of icing that the mere presence of cold clouds brings all fight instruction to a halt!

On the contrary, icing needs to be better understood.  We pilots need to understand that one can safely fly in cold clouds in non-known ice certified airplanes if three requirements are met: 

(1) Icing is NOT in the forecast nor reported for our planned altitude and route of flight;

(2) we understand the nature of airframe icing and under what atmospheric conditions it occurs, and

(2) we always have a golden "back door" or bolt hole that we can go through at the instant icing is first encountered.

The first requirement is provided to us by the FAA and court decisions.  Requirements #2 and #3 must be learned!  They do not come to us via regulatory guidance.  Unfortunately, flight schools and flight instructors who see only the first requirement are leaving their students dangerously, no . . . very dangerously under-prepared.  And that is why they die!

As was evidenced in the above referenced AOPA forum, there is a body of believers in the flight training community who adhere to the notion that any effort to provide students with an in-flight, realistic understanding of requirements #2 and #3 are setting a bad example and should change their wayward approach to teaching.

There are Two Sides to Every Issue, Of Course . . .

I really do not mean to discredit those in the flight training community who hold a very conservative approach to teaching and who promote a literal interpretation and blind obedience to the FARs.  These "right or wrong, follow the regulations" proponents are among the most well-intentioned members of our community.

The problem is, however, that the FAR/AIM cannot possibly cover every possible in-flight scenario.  Even if we re-wrote and expanded the regulations to cover every possible in-flight scenario, the volumes of text would be so large that nobody could remember them all!

Nor do I endorse those cavalier flight instructors who make up their own rules as they go along.  As we know, such "bold" pilots seldom become "old" pilots!

But somewhere between those two extremes resides the truth.  We must find a point where we do not teach safety by keeping pilots ignorant. 

We do need to do a much better job of equipping pilots to think on the go.  This is called aeronautical decision making.  We need to safely expose them to realistic ground and in-flight decision making scenarios under the watchful supervision of properly trained, experienced flight instructors who, themselves have observed the beast and made appropriate (per regulations) choices. 

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