Welcome to the Over the Airwaves aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the world. Its aim is to promote flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build enthusiasm for aviation in general.

X	"As with most meteorological adversaries, icing is not an incredibly complicated beast, and a little bit of knowledge can go a long way toward staying out of the accident files." — Karsten Shein, Physical Scientist, Professional Pilot Magazine, December, 2005.

Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:

Weather!

While we may grow weary of reading these numbers, we should not forget that of the 311 fatal general aviation accidents in 2003, 236 (75.9%) were officially attributed to pilot error. That's right. Seemingly good pilots did dumb things.

In each of these fatal accidents, the pilot found himself in a position where the level of risk exceeded his or her level of piloting skill and/or the capability of his airplane and he simply lost the match. Simple mistakes, tragic outcomes.

Taking a closer look, when we speak of skill we mean the total inventory of piloting abilities, from stick and rudder, to basic airmanship, to weather analysis, to aeronautical decision making. We are also referring to the capability of the airplane being flown.

Risks refers to anything that can hurt us from the time we get up in the morning, get in the car and drive to the airport, climb into the airplane, takeoff, cruise, land, and drive back home again from the airport.

Fortunately, most of these risks are manageable. Somebody cuts us off on the highway, we manage to recover and continue on our ride to the airport. We takeoff into a crosswind, apply the correct control inputs, and then climb effortlessly to our cruise altitude. We descend on the approach, often solely by reference to instruments, through the turbulent clag right down to just 200 feet above the ground before the runway comes into sight. It's all in the day's work for the proficient pilot.

The proficient pilot recognizes risks as special circumstances requiring unique abilities. Once the pilot determines that his or her skills and the capability of his airplane exceed the risks, he moves on with confidence. Should his skills or aircraft capability be less than the risks, the risks become dangers and it is the dangers that ultimately hurt him.

Skills + Aircraft Capability versus Risks = Risk Assessment

Risk assessment is nothing other than comparing one's skills, including the capabilities of his airplane, with the apparent risks of situation. While appearing simple, the process itself requires considerable insight and self-analysis. Look at the risk assessment scenario below.

Here is the skill: John passed his instrument checkride today. The FAA has deemed him a qualified instrument pilot. As such, he has demonstrated the skills to fly safely in instrument conditions. He plans to fly his wife and children to a family reunion in a turbocharged Cessna 210 with known ice certification.

Here is the risk: Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) exist from 200'AGL with layered clouds to flight level 240 from John's departure airport to his planned destination 275 miles to the east. The freezing level ranges from 6,000' down to the surface along his entire route of flight. A warm front carrying lots of moisture is converging along his planned route with a rapidly moving cold front coming down from the north. Airmets Tango (turbulence), Zulu (icing), and Sierra (IFR and mountain obscuration) are in the forecast. A deep low pressure area is situated directly over his planned destination and alternate airports.

Are John's skills and aircraft capability greater or less than the risks inherent in this flight?

If John had thousands of hours of hard instrument flight time in the northern latitudes, he might reasonably commence this trip after having mapped out numerous escape routes or backdoors along the entire route of flight. Unfortunately, this is not our John. Instead, per the Practical Test Standards (PTS), John demonstrated the skills necessary to make two non-precision and one precision approach (under the hood), holding patterns, course interception, and rudimentary aeronautical decision making (ADM) skills. That is it! Beyond that, he is an instrument novice whose ticket is not yet wet.

If John's risk assessment skills are solid, he certainly would not initiate this mission. Instead, he would wait for another day when the weather was substantially better. Easy decision, right?

Some Risk Assessment Scenarios are NOT so easy!

Let's change the scenario just a bit. John now has 300 hours of logged instrument time. The weather is not quite as bad. The airmets have expired. The only problem is low ceilings at his destination with a forecast occasional light icing on the descent. Winds at his destination are forecast to be 300 at 15 knots with gusts to 22 knots. The only runway available is 5/23. All of his airplane's anti-icing gear works properly except his propeller heat. Should he go? Hmmm - this is a tougher call.

Unfortunately, the instrument pilot knowledge test does not include scenario-based questions such as this. Of the instrument pilot oral exams that I have sat in on, only a couple that I can recall have taken the candidate down this scenario road. So where do we learn and assess such risk assessment skills?

Remember, 75.9 percent of all fatal accidents are attributed to pilot error (poor risk assessment skills). It matters little whether the contributing factors were high crosswinds, thunderstorms, icing, spatial disorientation, or fuel exhaustion. The final circumstances were such that the risks were greater than the skills.

Optimal risk assessment skills cannot be imparted or acquired solely by sitting at a table or desk and talking about them. Instead, they come from actual experience in the aeronautical battlefield itself with the pilot seated along side an experienced flight instructor who is skilled at risk assessment and aeronautical decision making. The more challenging scenarios he encounters, the better his aeronautical decision making skills become.

Fly Safe!

Bob Miller, ATP, MCFI
Master Certificated Flight Instructor
Buffalo, NY
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100

Take a Mooney M20J, load in four passengers plus pilot, top off with full fuel, and baggage and guess what? You're 295 pounds over the maximum takeoff weight with the calculated CG is 4.88 inches aft of CG loading envelope. Would you launch anyway? Of course not, but this pilot did - with fatal consequences.

Actually, the overweight, out of balance Mooney did lift off and fly. In fact, this particular aircraft climbed up to 9,000 feet on the way up to its cleared altitude of 11,000 feet. All five people perished in this accident.

Details of this fatal flight . . .

So what is a guy in this situation supposed to do? He's performing his pre-flight at the FBO at the Nashville, TN International Airport FBO. He's got four passengers plus himself wanting to get up to Roanoke, Virginia. He checks the weather. Here's what the FSS specialist said about his briefing to the pilot . . .

"...I advised the pilot of flight advisories for moderate rime or mixed icing between 3,000 and 20,000 for the Tennessee portion of the flight and between 4,000 and 20,000 for the Virginia portion [of the flight]. Also, moderate turbulence below 10,000 over Tennessee and mountain obscuration."

In addition, an AIRMET Zulu covering the route and the duration of his planned flight called for occasional moderate rime/mixed icing in clouds and in precipitation between 5,000 feet and 11,000 feet. Also on file was a PIREP from a Cessna 340 pilot reporting icing conditions while descending between 10,800 feet, and 8,500 feet.

Do you see an accident chain developing here?

Sometimes the cards are stacked against us before we launch. It would appear that this pilot was facing the entire deck! He's overweight, out of CG limits, with more people on board than seats, and he's looking squarely in the face of IMC weather with reported ice along his route of flight. Was his brain turned on?

Here's the problem . . . and there are several!

Operating overweight or out-of-CG airplanes effectively makes you a test pilot. Nobody, including the aircraft manufacturer and the FAA, knows how this airplane will fly in various flight attitudes or weather environments. Stall speeds may increase dramatically. They may no longer be spin resistant or recoverable. In fact, all of the aerodynamic safeguards in the FAA's certification process may no longer be present. This fact, alone, should prevent any pilot from taking off overweight or outside of the CG envelope! Add a touch of ice on the wing and all bets are off.

The final radar data . . .

"Review of radar data obtained from the FAA for the accident flight revealed the airplane "leveled off" at 9,400 feet at 1140:27. The airplane then began another climb at 1141:19, and reached a maximum altitude of 9,700 feet, before it descended back down to 9,400 feet at 1142:07. At 1142:16, the airplane entered a steep vertical descent, and radar contact with the airplane was lost at 1142:30, at an altitude of 7,700 feet."

The NTSB accident report of this crash provides us with only rudimentary information regarding the actual cause of the crash (see below). It does not tell us precisely what happened. We can only surmise the cause. Perhaps the pilot encountered icing. Perhaps he had to pitch up to maintain airspeed and quickly found himself in a stall. The altered wing shape may have created a yaw moment that produced a spin. With an aft CG, it may have been a non-recoverable flat spin.

NTSB Probable Cause Finding:

"The pilot's improper weather evaluation, which resulted in a loss of aircraft control. Factors in this accident were icing conditions, and aircraft loading which exceed the airplane's weight and balance limitations."

Standing before the judge . . .

This is the year 2006. You can be guaranteed that any personal injury or fatality will result in a law suit. If you are the pilot-in-command (PIC) of an accident aircraft, either your attorney or the attorney for your estate will have to produce a reasonable defense of your actions.

Imagine the difficulty this accident pilot's estate attorney will have in presenting a reasonable defense! No insurance limits will likely be sufficient to protect his assets or those of his estate against multi-million dollar civil penalties levied against him.

In summary, whether 295 pounds over gross or 0.1 pound over gross, you're over gross! Whether 4.88 inches aft of the CG envelope or 0.1 inches aft, you're still operating outside of the CG envelope. If you have an accident with injuries or fatalities, you're guilty, guilty, guilty. And you or your estate could be financially wiped out! Think about the family members you leave behind. Ponder that the next time you load up your airplane . . . .

It is too bad that the legal penalties for our blunders as pilots are not more widely publicized. If they were, maybe we would all become more adept at aeronautical decision making.

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In most cases, air carriers are required to have an approved method of complying with Subpart I of Parts 121 and 135 (Airplane Performance Operating Limitations). This means that flight crews must comply with the approach and landing performance criteria in the applicable regulations prior to departing for their intended destination.

Typically, the approved aircraft flight manual (AFM) for a large turbine powered airplane must contain information that allows flight crews to determine that the airplane will be capable of performing the following actions, considering the airplane’s landing weight and other pertinent environmental factors:

• Land within the distance required by the regulations.

• Climb from the missed approach point (MAP) and maintain a specified climb gradient with one engine inoperative.

• Perform a go-around from the final stage of landing and maintain a specified climb gradient with all engines operating and the airplane in the landing configuration.

The graphic below illustrates what can happen if the the incorrect landing configuration is used when a missed approach is required:

Proper landing configurations are not spelled out for GA pilots!

Most GA airplanes do not have specific methods and procedures spelled out in their POHs regarding landing speeds and flap settings for particular flight operations. And those methods and procedures that are spelled out, e.g., short field and soft field operations, may not be appropriate for all such circumstances.

Example: You are setting up for landing on a short field with obstacles on the departure end of the runway. Your POH calls for full flaps and an approach speed of Vso x 1.3 knots. That configuration assures you of being able to come to a safe stop. So far, so good!

But what if circumstances require you to execute a last minute a go-around? Will that short field configuration specified in your POH allow you to clear any departure obstacles? Perhaps not! Sure, you can reconfigure your airplane for the go-around, but you could distracted by the urgency that caused the go-around. Perform that reconfiguration incorrectly and you could precipitate an even bigger problem.

Plan every approach to landing with a go-around or missed approach in mind . . .

The applicable regulations for GA pilots is FAR 91.103 which states:

Sec. 91.103 - Preflight action.

Each pilot in command shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all available information concerning that flight. This information must include --

(a) For a flight under IFR or a flight not in the vicinity of an airport, weather reports and forecasts, fuel requirements, alternatives available if the planned flight cannot be completed, and any known traffic delays of which the pilot in command has been advised by ATC;

(b) For any flight, runway lengths at airports of intended use, and the following takeoff and landing distance information:

(1) For civil aircraft for which an approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual containing takeoff and landing distance data is required, the takeoff and landing distance data contained therein; and

(2) For civil aircraft other than those specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, other reliable information appropriate to the aircraft, relating to aircraft performance under expected values of airport elevation and runway slope, aircraft gross weight, and wind and temperature.

In other words, do not arrive at your destination without knowing in advance what your best landing configuration should be, e.g., flap setting and airspeed requirements. If conditions at your destination airport (and/or planned alternate) require a modified landing configuration to avoid obstacles should a go-around or missed approach be required, know them before you depart!

Feet off the brakes!!

It would be interesting to know which phrase flight instructors use more: (1) "More right rudder," or (2) "Keep you feet off the brakes."

A Cirrus SR22 pilot learned this lesson the hard (and expensive) way earlier last month after taxiing for nearly one mile to the departure end of the runway at the David Wayne Hooks Airport in Houston, TX. Just before takeoff, the tower radioed the pilot and reported that his right main landing gear was on fire!

The pilot and his two passengers jumped out of the aircraft and attempted unsuccessfully to put out the fire with the on-board portable fire extinguisher. Two mechanics from a nearby hangar were able to extinguish the fire using large capacity fire extinguishers. The right main landing gear and lower right wing sustained substantial thermal damage.

Pilot experience offers no immunity

The pilot of this airplane held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with 4,100-hours of Air Force experience. He had previously completed 5.5 hours of flight training at a Cirrus certified training center to obtain his SR22/20 Cirrus pilot certification.

We cannot tell from the preliminary NTSB report whether this pilot was dragging the brakes or if there was a defect in the brake assembly. Either way, something was sufficiently wrong to create a fire. A review of the accident database revealed several similar events involving brake fires on Cirrus SR20 and SR22 airplanes.

We do know that the Cirrus SR22, like the Columbia 400, has a free castering nose wheel. The only way to steer these models of aircraft is via differential braking or by taxiing quickly enough for the rudder to be aerodynamically effective.

Proper power management to reduce braking . . .

Brakes have only two purposes. The first is to facilitate steering. The other is stop the airplane. When doing neither, one's feet should be OFF the brakes. Unfortunately, most airplane brakes are co-located with the rudder pedals. This makes it easy for pilots to apply brake pressure unnecessarily.

Where does this bad pilot practice begin?

Like most every other bad habits, the problem typically begins with poor flight instruction. It is compounded by the fact that most of us learn to fly rented airplanes where the cost of brake pad replacement is borne by somebody else. If students were charged for each time they applied the brakes, this problem could be eliminated.

Medical Issues

The image of an aviation medical examiner (AME) with a bad news look on his face can produce more fear in the heart of a weather-worn, battle-hardened pilot than any in-flight emergency could ever create. With a stroke of a pen, he (or she) can bring a pilot's flying career to an instant halt - at least for 120 days or more.

For years, the medical side of the FAA's vast powers remained a mystery for pilots, particularly to those pilots whose papers had to be forwarded to Oklahoma City for further evaluation. Once that door was opened, it was like the penetrating a thunderstorm with little or no hope of ever coming out the other side.

Budget Constrains or Rationality?

Thankfully, this cloak of mystery is lifting somewhat and a hint of rationality is beginning to appear. Whether it is the federal budget problem or the FAA's Air Surgeon's office has begun to see the light, more and more of the pilot certification authority is being pushed back down to the local aviation medical examiner (AME). Similarly, increasing numbers of surgical procedures and health conditions, once sure-fire deal killers for pilots, are being approved for pilots.

Good News for Eyes

The FAA's Aeromedical folks in Oklahoma City recently approved multifocal implants for persons with cataracts. Similarly, multi-focus contact lenses were also approved. These and other non-eye related surgical procedures and medications are slowly being added to the approved list.

Insulin-dependent diabetics, once banished from the cockpit, can now qualify for a third-class medical certificate.

Unfortunately, some conditions remain in the disqualifier category. If you report them, you're through flying - unless a special issuance certificate can be secured. If you fail to report them, you face a $250,000 fine and five years in prison. Beware . . . the feds have developed computer programs linking Airman Medical Applications to Social Security Disability forms and other medical reimbursement records! And you will do the time!!!!

Become a Medically Savvy Airman!

Three Steps to Keeping your Medical

Step I: The first and most important thing we pilots can do is protect our health. This begins by realizing that many of our medically disqualifying conditions are lifestyle related. We do not want to acknowledge this, but numerous forms of heart disease, hypertension, cancer, stroke, and diabetes are self-induced by our decisions to smoke, make poor nutritional choices, fail to exercise regularly, and gain unnecessary weight.

Please note that as I write this, I admit to one time being a self-professed couch potato who enjoyed an occasional smoke, wine with each evening meal, and who indulged in regular desserts. In my yet to be published book titled, "Adventures in Flight," I write about rewarding myself at the end of each business flight away from home with a "big steak dinner with instructions to the waiter to keep the wine glass filled, and a piece of cheesecake as the final reward."

Then I nearly failed my FAA medical! Doctors orders . . . lose weight, make better food choices, and exercise regularly, or plan on losing your medical! That was an easy choice to make. Have you made yours?

Step II: The next step is to NOT throw yourself to the mercy of the aviation medical examiner (AME)! NEVER, EVER allow the AME to uncover something about yourself that you do not already know. Know your blood pressure before going to see the AME. Are you spilling sugar into your urine? Finding that out in the AME's office when you fill that little bottle is too late! Having trouble seeing anything other that the big "E" on the eye chart? Can't hear a whisper from across a room? Know these things before you go in.

Similarly, be absolutely truthful when completing the medical history section on the medical form BUT know what the possible implications are to each "YES" you enter on the form. What may appear to be an innocuous admission could be a deal killer as far as your medical is concerned.

Step III: Do your homework. Know the parameters of an approved medical. Today, we have many resources to help us navigate the tricky medical mine fields that can ground ANY pilot.

For example, click on http://www.amazon.com to order your copy of a wonderful 230 page book titled "Health For Pilots - A Complete Guide to FAA Medical Certification and Self-Care" by Paul M. Gahlinger, MD, PH.D and Senior Aviation Medical Examiner (and OTA subscriber). This book lays it on the line. Read it. It could save your medical!

Another outstanding information source is AOPA's TurboMedical Interactive Medical Application Form. Click HERE to access this online resource takes you step-by-step through FAA's medical application form. Completing this brief interactive exercise will make YOU an expert in the medical certification process.

In summary, I suspect that more pilots quit or are forced to stop flying because of medical issues than any other reason. You may still be an under-30 year old, super human specimen of optimal health. That's great. But for those of us passing through mid-life, our flying future is in our own hands. We better know what we're doing!

My instrument student, Mark Croce, had just finished an eight hour marathon training session in his new Cirrus SR22. This training began at Buffalo (KBUF) in IMC conditions. Our first stop was Watertown (NY) Airport, 134 miles to the northeast with much of the flight over Lake Ontario. We flew the ILS 7 approach then headed 42 miles south to Oswego (KFZY).

Still in the clouds, I disabled the MFD (multi-function display shown on the right in photo below) and the PFD (primary flight display shown on the left in the photo below). This left Mark with only the Garmin 430's and the emergency three instruments (airspeed, heading indicator, and altimeter).

Mark set up for the approach to the GPS 24 approach to KFZY. We landed and had a delicious breakfast at the airport cafe. From there, we flew 52 miles south to the Ithaca Airport (KITH).

Still in IMC with both the PFD and MFD disabled, I requested and received the KITH VOR 14 approach as published. This required a procedure turn and a pre-arranged 10 minute hold at the published missed approach holding fix.

Leaving the KITH missed approach holding fix, we were cleared direct to the Elmira Airport (KELM), just 28 miles to the southwest. This put us into the path of worsening weather. We encountered light icing just as I was restoring the PFD and MFD.

Shortly after that, the MFD locked up much like a "frozen" computer! This was no simulation. It simply quit!

Since there is no on/off switch, there is no way to "reboot" the MFD other than to search for and pull the MFD circuit-breaker. The awkward position of the breaker panel required Mark, still in IMC, to reach down near his right rudder pedal, fumble for and and recycle the correct circuit-breaker to get the MFD going again (bad aircraft design feature).

Once this was accomplished, Mark returned his attention to the TKS anti-ice fluid oozing over the leading edge of the wings. With everything now working, he requested the KELM ILS 7 approach with the published missed approach. Warmer temperatures below 3,000' MSL shed the accumulated ice from the unprotected surfaces of the airplane.

A quick check with Flight Watch confirmed better weather conditions to the west and no reports of icing in that direction, so we proceeded 66 miles west to the Olean, NY airport (KOLE). Receiving clearance for the KOLE Localizer 22 approach, Mark quickly discovered that his PFD and MFD were disabled (intentionally by me). He also noted that the moving map pages on both Garmin 430s had "mysteriously" disappeared. Help!!!!!! Keep in mind that we're still in IMC.

The only directional guidance instrument left remaining was the magnetic compass. Cleveland Approach Control issued vectors to the final approach course. "I can't fly this approach without a localizer needle," said Mark!

"You're right," I replied. "Do anything you want to save our bacon," I added cryptically, "but don't touch the MFD or PFD . . . and for God sake, don't pull the chute!" Mark reached down and got the moving map page going on the number one Garmin 430. He dialed in the localizer frequency, briefed the approach plate, and masterfully guided us down to the published minimums.

We flew the published missed approach course, then on to the Jamestown, NY airport (KJHW), 40 miles to the west. By now, Mark had mastered nearly every possible partial panel arrangement there was. Some 20 miles east of Jamestown we, again, encountered icing conditions. Mark requested and received clearance to climb to clear air at 8,000' MSL.

Decision time! The KJHW AWOS was reporting a 100' ceiling and 1/4 mile visibility. Hmmm . . . knowing that the clouds below contained ice and with KJHW now down below ILS landing minimums, we did the logical thing and requested a destination change back to our home base in Buffalo 53 miles to the north.

After landing in Buffalo, we discussed our day's experience and replayed the decisions we made along the way.

Now for the REAL Emergency!

Armed with confidence that he had experienced the worst instrument failures imaginable just two days earlier, we took another training flight to Franklin, PA (KFKL). I was riding in the right seat as usual and Mark's friend and co-owner of the Cirrus SR22 we were flying, Joe DeMarco, was observing from the back seat.

Everything in this flight was routine. I gave Mark a break and let him have a full instrument panel to work with on this 40 minute IMC flight. The only troubling item was an occasionally flickering alternator #2 annunciator light that lit only during low RPM operation. Mark flew the ILS 21 approach to KFKL and landed uneventfully on the snow covered runway.

We had a delightful lunch at the airport restaurant. We discussed the troublesome #2 alternator annunciator light with Mark explaining that the factory told him to expect this during low RPM operations. I instantly recalled several months earlier when the Columbia factory told me to disregard a "faulty" door ajar annunciator light. That was the day that the butterfly hinged right hand passenger door suddenly blew open during takeoff!!!!

We filed an instrument plan back to Buffalo. As we taxied out, the #1 alternator annunciator light began to flicker right along with the #2 alternator annunciator. We agreed that this may be due to our low RPM setting.

The flickering went away during the run-up and remained off during the takeoff roll. Everything was going along fine. No annunciator lights were shining, so we picked up our IFR clearance airborne and climbed up into the clouds.

Trouble ahead!

Now above the clouds and winging happily home, it was then the things began to fall apart quickly - for real! The #1 alternator annunciator light came on bright. Next, the low voltage annunciator light also shined bright red. We flipped over to the systems status page on the MFD. The #1 electrical buss displayed a steadily declining voltage readout. It was quickly apparent that our primary alternator had actually failed and the #1 battery was quickly discharging.

Mark instantly pulled out and reviewed the POH emergency pages. They warned that we would soon lose the MFD and other non-essential electrical components. The PFD and one Garmin 430 (and the three emergency back instruments) would remain operable as long as we did not lose the #2 alternator. I recalled the flickering #2 alternator annunciator light when we were on the ground. My confidence in this #2 alternator was beginning to wane. We were in a bad place and the three of us knew it!

As anticipated, the MFD failed within three or four minutes of the #1 alternator failure. For some reason still unknown to us, Mark's intercom connection failed next. He could hear neither me nor ATC. There was no question in my mind. We had a full-blown emergency underway with our entire electrical system now in doubt. Without electrics, there is simply no way to keep the Cirrus SR22 upright in the clouds other than by rudimentary reference to the bouncing magnetic compass.

Note: For those who think we could continue navigating on battery power should we lose both alternators, think again. We observed the MFD fail just as soon as our #1 buss battery power dropped to 17.5 volts! We assumed that the primary flight display (PFD) would likely fail, too, very quickly if the #2 alternator dropped off. Perhaps not, but we were not going to take any chances.

I called and declared our emergency condition to the Erie Approach Controller and requested immediate vectors to the nearest airport - which was Jamestown just a few miles ahead. A band of snow showers was slowly moving toward the airport. There were a couple of holes in the clouds that we could, hopefully, bolt through in the event the entire electrical system tanked. This was our plan.

I advised ATC of our intention to descend immediately into VFR conditions and land at Jamestown VFR. Anticipating a possible loss of the com radios, I further stated that if we could not get to VFR we would fly the ILS 25 approach.

ATC replied, "The airport and the approach is yours. Advise when on the ground." We both knew that under our emergency authority, we could do pretty much whatever we needed to do to resolve the emergency, with or without a clearance.

Bad news! We could not get to VFR conditions.

Shifting bands of heavy snow moved in between us and the airport. The holes we saw earlier were well behind us. We were back into solid IMC conditions. Not surprisingly, the three of us remained remarkably calm despite the urgency of our situation. After all, Mark and I had practiced this very scenario many times just two days earlier.

By this time I had my portable Garmin 296 up and running with the Jamestown ILS 25 approach displayed on the color screen with the terrain avoidance page revealing obstacles passing by below. I could quickly shift between the Garmin 296 moving map page and the "six pack" instrument page. If our Cirrus primary flight displayed failed, the Garmin 296 would be quite literally our last and final navigation and aircraft control resource. Thankfully, I had a full charge on the 296 battery!

Marked quickly programmed the only remaining Garmin 430 for the ILS 25 approach as published. The procedure itself required us to fly to the initial approach fix (KRAUS), then fly outbound for the procedure turn, then back in and descend on the final approach course (Jamestown is outside of radar coverage).

Having the full procedure displayed on both the Garmin 430 and my Garmin 296, I elected to save several critical minutes by turning on the final approach course just inside the final approach fix (FAF). Once accomplished, the course deviation indicator (CDI) on the HSI quickly centered. Unfortunately, we were still well above the glideslope.

"Reduce power and push it down, I shouted to Mark recalling that his headset wasn't working. As a flight instructor giving instruction, I was the PIC responsible for the safe outcome of the flight. Despite this, I elected to have Mark continue to fly the airplane while I monitored the gauges and kept a close eye on our failing systems.

"Mark, flaps full now," I yelled. "We need to get back down to the glideslope." I then dialed in the Jamestown unicom and requested a runway braking report. A courteous lady, knowing of our emergency, reported that the runway was snow covered and braking action was unknown.

Again I called out, "Mark, full flaps right now, power to idle!"

"They won't go down," replied Mark. "They're on the bad buss!"

Hmmm!! We're inside the final approach fix still in IMC, three dots high on the glideslope with our airspeed approaching 140 knots (normal final approach speed is 75-80 knots), inoperative flaps, and landing on a snow covered runway with unfriendly terrain on the over-run side. Given our precarious electrical condition, I ruled out a missed approach. We had to make it in on one try. I began to wonder if lesser-trained pilots would given up and simply deployed the ballistic parachute and accepted the consequences of a bumpy and very dangerous uncontrolled vertical landing from a high speed, low altitude chute deployment.

"Okay, Mark, give me a forward slip, but be careful and keep the nose pointed down to avoid a cross-controlled stall," I shouted. By now I was on the controls and gently nudging in right rudder and left aileron. "Stay with me, Mark. The runway is in sight." He was more focused than any man I had ever observed in the left seat of an airplane!

The Cirrus SR22, like the Columbia 400, is a marvelously designed aircraft. Both, however, are new designs and certainly new to me. I wasn't sure just how far we could slip the airplane. We broke out at 400' agl. With the snow covered runway immediately ahead and our still excessive airspeed with no flaps (nor speed brakes like are equipped on the COL4), I quickly assessed our risks. A runway overshoot would be better than a stall/spin on short final!

Mark managed to touch down about one-third of the way down the 5,200' long runway. Braking proved to be fair to poor but we managed to roll to a stop well short of the runway end. We taxied over to the FBO where the waiting ramp service person attached a tug and pulled us directly into a warm hangar.

Problem found!

After removing the upper engine cowling, we immediately discovered the source of the electrical problem. The direct drive #1 alternator outer casing had nearly self-destructed. The four safety wired screws holding the alternator together had backed out and partially sheared. Vibration from the loose end of the alternator had caused the safety wire to carve a groove into the side of the metal alternator case. It would have been only minutes more of flying before the entire alternator assembly would have self-destructed and fallen out from the engine case.

With no replacement parts immediately available, we grabbed some dinner at the airport cafe, then took a rental car back to Buffalo.

Lessons Learned

Every flight affords an opportunity to learn for both new and experienced pilots alike. The more unique and varied the flights, the more one learns especially during the cold winters here in the Great Lakes region. Below is a summary of the learning points from this experience:

Learning Points

1. Murphy's Law - Anything Can Go Wrong:

The more sophisticated the airplane and/or the newer the aircraft design, the more things can and will go wrong! Know your aircraft systems. Know how they work . . . in detail!

2. Frequent Recurrent Training:

We need to prioritize the risks of flying, then we need to prioritize our recurrent training in the same order. The Cirrus SR22 like the Columbia 400 is an ALL ELECTRIC airplane. Our greatest risk is total electrical failure in the clouds. Train for this eventuality frequently.

Weather is another substantial risk to all aviators, therefore we need to engage in more frequent weather training. Not only should VFR-only pilots practice flying in instrument meteorological conditions, with a CFII on board, they should also master unusual attitude recovery in IMC conditions.

3. The Dependence on Redundant Systems is Dangerous Hoax:

Don't ever hang your life out on the presence of redundant systems. The only truly redundant system in our experience was my handheld, battery operated Garmin 296 GPS unit.

The Columbia 400 comes much closer than the Cirrus SR22 to having two truly independent electrical systems with a built-in cross-tie switch enabling ALL components to be connected to either fully independent electrical system. Still in all, both of these electrical systems come together under the nose cowling. One engine fire can take them both out in an instant! We need to have safe alternatives (back doors) when both redundant systems fail simultaneously. In our case, we had the handheld Garmin 296 GPS up and running.

4. Land as Soon as Practical:

FAR 91.7(b) requires that the PIC shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur. The annals of aviation accidents are replete with examples of pilots of distressed airplanes over-flying perfectly good airports in an attempt to reach their originally planned destination. If something affecting the safety of your flight goes amiss, land as soon as practical and check it out!

5. Flight Instructors MUST Engage in Advanced Recurrent Training:

Every CFI should receive emergency maneuvers recovery training, aerobatic training, and advanced aircraft systems training.

The skills learned from this advanced training should be passed down to primary students. Far too many primary students receive their initial and advanced flight training from minimally qualified CFIs. As a result, these flight students are dangerously under-prepared for the risks inherent in flight. Remember, 75% of all general aviation accidents are due to pilot error!

In an unrelated flight, an instrument once student asked me, "How do you prevent getting all tensed up during an emergency?" My answer was simple, practice emergencies often! The more practice you have, the less stress you feel when a real one comes along. And the less stress you experience, the more effectively you can think.

Note: There have been three fatal Cirrus accidents in just the past few weeks. The first involved continued VFR flight into IMC conditions, the second involved collision with terrain in reduced visibility. The third, near Lancaster, CA is suspected to involve gusty winds while taking off. The need for frequent recurrent training in these and all other GA aircraft is critical.

A Pilot's Guide to In-Flight Icing is a free, online course primarily intended for the general aviation pilot who flies aircraft certified for flight in icing, although much of the information is applicable to all pilots. With an operational focus, this course provides tools pilots can use to deal with in-flight icing. Emphasis is on avoidance, detection and exit, as well as the effects of ice accretion on performance and handling and the particular hazard of Supercooled Large Droplet (SLD) icing.

This self-guided training aid contains imagery captured on NASA Icing Research flights, animation, pilot testimonials, case studies, and interactive demonstrators. In addition, interactive exercises allow the user to asses his or her operational understanding of the key points presented.

System Requirements: Flash Player 6 or higher and a Javascript-enabled browser. Users should also disable pop-up blocking software while using the course.

Click HERE to begin the course.

"Over the Airwaves" is all about flight safety, encouraging effective risk management assessment and sound aeronautical decision making (ATM), and promoting the importance of frequent recurrent training. If every general aviation pilot fully embraced these issues, our serious accident rate would tumble.

YOU can help to make this happen by sending the web link (URL) to "Over the Airwaves" to each of your pilot friends and acquaintances. Post this link the aviation forums. CFIs, encourage your students to sign on.

Just a reminder . . .

"Over the Airwaves" is a free, non-commercial bi-weekly aviation e-publication. Subscriber names and email addresses will NEVER be shared, sold, or disseminated to any other person or organization.

You are buried in the clouds. Suddenly the airplane lurches. Startled by the unexpected upset, you instinctively stare at the panel. Your brain has frozen. The information you need to save your bacon is staring you right in the face. It doesn't register.

Houston, we have a problem!

You begin to see and interpret the instruments. The airspeed indicator is registering zero airspeed. The attitude indicator shows you in a 15 degree pitch up attitude and rolling left. Unless you do something NOW, it may be impossible to recover from the IMC spin that will ensue in the next five seconds!

The possible causes for this condition are many. They include: (1) severe turbulence; (2) excessive airframe icing; (3) spatial disorientation; (4) wake turbulence upset; (5) frozen Pitot tube; (6) vacuum pump failure; (7) autopilot malfunction; or (8) thunderstorm penetration.

What do you do?

Perceive: Recognize that you have problem requiring immediate attention. The airspeed indicator and attitude indicator are both sending information that runs contrary to your perceived condition of flight.

Process: Diagnose the problem. Is it an instrument failure? What's the likelihood of a multiple instrument failure with gauges operating on two separate systems, e.g., Pitot system and vacuum system? Look for tie-breaking information. Is the stall horn sounding? Does your GPS groundspeed read out confirm your zero indicated airspeed? Does your heading indicator confirm that you are in a turn? If the instruments are working correctly, you are in an imminent stall/spin!

Perform: Add full power - neutralize the ailerons - step on the high wing rudder pedal to level the wings - pitch forward to break the stall. This is the "PARE" procedure advocated by Rich Stowell, author of numerous books and articles on spin recoveries. P-Power; A-ailerons, neutralize; R-rudder, opposite the turn; E-elevator, pitch forward.

You must act fast and you must act correctly!

Remember, this scenario is taking place in the clouds, not in VFR conditions where you have quick outside reference to the horizon and the ground below. The required corrective actions are NOT instinctive. Don't count on knowing what to do in the midst of this startling situation . . . unless you have practiced it over and over and over.

I recently put one of my instrument students in a mild unusual attitude while in IMC. His instinctive corrective maneuvers compounded the problem and put us precisely in the stall/spin configuration depicted by the airspeed and attitude indicators pictured above. In other words, his instinctive incorrect actions instantly worsened the problem to the point that had he been alone, the airplane would not have been recoverable!

I repeated this exercise several times until the student was able to successfully apply the correct control inputs.

Object lessons . . .

Point One: Unusual attitudes in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) are often fatal for the non-proficient instrument pilot.

Point Two: Instrument proficiency decays quickly in time, e.g., days and weeks.

Point Three: If you are an instrument rated pilot who occasionally flies in the clouds, unless you have practiced unusual attitude recoveries IN THE CLOUDS, you'll likely not know how to recover properly should a real upset occur.

Point Four: Unless you are proficient, you and your passengers will likely not survive a serious upset in the clouds. If you are not instrument proficient (including able to recover from unusual attitudes in the clouds), do NOT enter IMC conditions.

Caution: DO NOT practice the above exercise in actual instrument conditions unless you have an instrument proficient flight instructor with you.

How to Waste Your Flight Training Money

Many more people would like to learn how to fly than actually do become private pilots. Many more private pilots would like to obtain an instrument rating than who actually do get that rating. Arguably, the number one reason why this disparity between "wishes" and "achievement" is money.

Today, it should cost anywhere between $6,000 and $9,000 to obtain a private pilot certificate. One can expect to spend an equal amount of money securing an instrument rating. Very sadly, many aspiring private and instrument pilots actually spend far more than that.

The last instrument student I signed off for checkride came to me from another flight school. He had logged 190 hours of dual instrument instruction time over a two year period given to him by four different school-based flight instructors before he came to me in bitter frustration. Figuring an average cost for airplane and instructor of, say, $130 per hour, that equals $24,700! Whoa . . . see anything wrong with this picture?

Five Ways to Avoid Spending Too Much for Flight Training

1. Train Frequently:

Our nation's colleges and universities typically schedule academic courses to meet at least two to three days per week. When in high school, most math, science, and language classes are scheduled five days per week. Even people wishing to improve their physical fitness spend three, four, or fives days a week in the gym.

But when it comes to flight instruction, it is not unusual for students to receive only one flight lesson per week. With weather delays and normal scheduling conflicts, some flight students get into the air only once every two or three weeks!!

If you get into the air any less frequently than twice weekly, you are wasting your flight training money! Why? Because your flight instructor will spend at least one-third of each instructional hour reviewing previously covered items. If you miss an entire week, any skills developed in the previous lesson will have to be re-taught. Each hour of re-training translates to wasted money.

2. Choose your Flight Instructor Carefully:

There is, perhaps, more variability in flight instructor skills, abilities, and experience than in any training endeavor. A truly good flight instructor can get his or her teaching points over more quickly and efficiently than a less skilled flight instructor. He or she can also diagnose and correct student skill deficiencies more accurately than a less skilled flight instructor. This all translates to "hours of required training." And hours translate to dollars.

3. Do Not Change Flight Instructors Before Your Rating is Achieved:

Each time you change flight instructors, you will waste at least $1,200 in re-training costs. That's because each new instructor must spend least 8 to 10 hours of expensive training time figuring out where you are and then bringing you up to his or her speed. It makes little difference if you are following a rigid Part 141 training curriculum. Each new instructor has his or her personal preferences for the way things should be done.

If this has happened to you, count the number of replacement instructors that have been involved in your rating-related training. Multiply that number by $1,200. That's the amount of money your have wasted.

4. Do Your Homework:

If you do not aggressively review and self-analyze each flight lesson at home and put in several hours preparing for your next lesson, you are wasting money by paying your instructor to "spoon feed" it to you. On the other hand, if you are rich and money is no object to you, then sit back and be "spoon fed!"

5. Learn It Correctly the First Time:

This may surprise you, but the FAA is not very imaginative when it comes to knowledge testing. As you climb the ratings ladder, you'll see many of the very same questions on the instrument, commercial, CFI, and ATP knowledge tests that you saw on the private pilot knowledge test! The oral portions of these advanced ratings also include items contained on your private pilot oral.

Many primary pilots seek ways to "memorize" the answers to written and oral exam questions without truly understanding the answers. This makes the pursuit of advanced ratings a much more time-consuming (expensive) effort. Learn and understand this material the first time, and the remainder of your flight training will be much less expensive.

Following these five basic ways to avoid wasting money is guaranteed to dramatically reduce both the time and money required to achieve your rating.

As mentioned above, money is one of the most frequently stated reasons for not taking flying lessons or advancing to the next rating. Learning to fly is expensive enough. Anything we do to make it more expensive hurts us and it hurts the entire general aviation industry.

In summary . . . let's not forget the fact that less than one-half of all people who pursue a private pilot certificate ever complete the training and acquire the certificate. Two major reasons for this deplorable drop out rate are: (1) discouragement and (2) money.

Five good ways to increase the level of discouragement and to increase the cost of training is to: (1) stretch out the training; (2) choose the wrong flight instructor; (3) go through multiple flight instructors; (4) fail to do your homework between lessons; and (5) try to memorize rather than "learn" the required information!

Quotable

"First, you need to find standardized power settings, pitch attitudes, and configurations (gear and flap positions) for every phase of flight, and then use these habitually in your flying."
-- John C. Eckalbar, author, IFR - A Structured Approach.

There are few things more unsettling to a flight instructor or a designated pilot examiner (DPE) than watching an instrument pilot sawing the throttle back and forth on the ILS in a vain attempt to capture and maintain the glideslope. It is equally frustrating observing primary students pushing and pulling on the yoke to find some desired airspeed as they transition from the downwind, to the base, and the final approach segment to the runway threshold.

Somewhere along the line they throw in some flaps, then massage the throttle back and forth as the airplane pitches uncomfortably up and down. The plane and pilot eventually hit the runway either too fast or too slow in a memorable series of bounces and bumps

Poor piloting skills? No, poor instruction!

This is a purely unscientific observation, but of the many pilots with whom I have flown, from private pilot to ATP, a significant number were victims of poor initial instruction. When asked what power setting, pitch angle, and configuration (gear/flaps) they need in their airplane to maintain 90 knots on a three degree glideslope, I get nothing back but a blank stare.

"What do you mean," they ask incredulously?

"Well, how do you control descent rate and airspeed on your final approach to the airport?" is my oft-stated reply.

Scratching their head, they say, "I pitch to intercept the glideslope (or VASI), then I adjust power to control airspeed. If I'm going too fast, I'll back off the power and add flaps, and maybe alter my pitch angle."

"Where did you learn to do it that way," I reply?

"That's the way I was taught. My instructor always told me to do whatever was necessary with power, pitch, and flaps to achieve my desired approach speed."

Therein lies the reason why it takes so long to master landings and later to obtain an instrument rating!

As John Eckalbar, author of the much acclaimed book titled, IFR - A Structured Approach, points out, the first step in mastering instrument flight is to standardize power settings, pitch attitudes, and configuration (gear and flap position) for each phase of flight.

I typically do this in each new airplane I fly. For example, in the trainers I ask the student to give me a power setting to maintain hands free, level flight at 90 knots. It generally takes them five to six minutes to arrive at this setting. Once done, I say, "Write down that power setting."

Then I say, "Take a look at your pitch attitude and flap setting. Make note of that, too."

While maintaining that level flight 90 knot power setting, pitch attitude, and configuration, I ask them to reduce the power just enough to maintain a 500 foot/minute descent rate. They quickly discover that a 300 RPM reduction in power is all that is necessary to achieve this. I instruct them to write down that reduced power setting.

Lastly, I ask them to determine what power reduction, pitch attitude, and flap setting is required to maintain 70 knots on short final. After a bit of practice, they discover that another 300 RPM power reduction plus 20 degrees of flaps will do the job very nicely. Again, those numbers are written down.

Memorize those power settings, pitch attitudes, and flap configurations.

Once these critical numbers are memorized, the student is able to quickly and efficiently reconfigure his airplane from fast cruise to slow cruise flight. From there, he can effortlessly descend in the pattern (or on the instrument approach course) to the waiting runway below. All it takes is known power reductions, pitch attitudes, and flap settings. No more chasing the needles. He's locked on the glideslope at the desired airspeed as if by magic! Moments later, the wheels kiss the runway in a gentle "squeak - squeak." No bounces or bumps.

This works for me every time in my T-210. When cleared from 3,000' to 2,300' to intercept the localizer, I slowly reduce power from 30"MP to 25"MP. Propeller RPM remains the same. The nose drops about five degrees and I descend at about 400 feet per minute. At glide slope intercept, I reduce power to 17"MP and commence a 650 feet per minute, 3 degree descent. Inside the final approach fix (FAF), I lower the gear and bring in 10 degrees of flaps. The nose down pitch moment from the lowered gear and the pitch up moment from the lowered flaps offset each other to maintain the previous descent rate.

These numbers keep me pegged on the glideslope at 115 knots right down to the decision height (DH).

At decisions height, I do one of two things: If landing, I reduce power to 11"MP and add another 10 degrees of flaps. If going missed, power is immediately increased to 34"MP, RPM to the wall, and flaps retracted to 10 degrees after positive climb rate is established. It doesn't get any easier than that!

Know your numbers for climb, fast cruise, slow cruise, three degree glideslope descent, and the missed approach, too!

Airplanes respond to all of the laws of physics. Once you set in the desired power, pitch attitude, and configuration of gear and flaps, the airplane will respond the same way, every time. Sure, gross weight, altitude, and gusty winds will have an effect, but this effect will be negligible in the grand scheme of things.

No more guessing or fidgeting on final approach. Go out, record and memorize your numbers!

Read Back

The following reader comments were received over the past two weeks:

"Excellent job with the newsletter!"
-- Alex Hernandez, Snyder, NY

"I recently at age 48 earned my Flight Instructor Rating and also joined NAFI. I was surprised that they don't promote your newsletter. I learned about it from a PP friend that knows I want to stay abreast of everything in order to be a good CFI. Obviously I like what I see!!"
--Terry Hocking, Nashwauk, Minnesota

I found your Newsletter searching for tips on landing technique - and really appreciate the wisdom you share.
-- Andrew Irvine, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

"I very much enjoyed reading what you had to offer. It's all to often that many of these items get overlooked. I remember when I was doing my flight training, and one of my favorite flight instructors was the one who broke away from the hour long lesson of landing on the same runway and actually had me practice landing with tailwinds and extreme (not so bad now, but with 20 hours back then seemed to be) crosswinds.

I am currently working on my instructor rating and plan on using a lot of your articles to share with my students so that they can see life outside of the training bubble."
-- Sarah LaPrise, Greenwood, Nova Scotia, Canada

Recommend by my flight instructor!
-- S. Eigles, Cumberland, MD

"I recently subscribed under another address but wanted to read your great publication in the office as well. As a pastor and a pilot it gives me a chance to keep my head in the clouds either way!"
-- Howard Drabek, Richmond, TX

"Great looking newsletter, thanks!"
-- Eric Lindberg

I'm a CFII/MEI (Gold Seal) currently serving as CAP FL Wing Air Ops safety officer and a check pilot. Also an ASC. Got this from Jim Kaletta. I'm impressed with not only the info but the look of the newsletter. I pass this on to all my safety officers."
-- Lee Wedlake, Ft. Myers, FL

"I heard about Over the Airways in an AOPA forum and have downloaded and printed every issue to date. As a student (a 58 year old student!), I'm always learning and have picked up a lot of good ideas and appreciated your commentaries in the issues I've read so far. Thank you."
-- Ron Goldfarb

"Very well done. Thanks!"
--Colonel Laurence Plumb, MD,MC,FS (almost retired from the NY Army NAtional Guard) FAA Aeromedical Examiner, Instrument Rated Private Pilot

"I am a 60 Year old corporate pilot and "very" part time flight instructor. I agree that the currency requirements for CFIs is ridiculous. I have 17,000 hours + as a corporate pilot in some of the worst weather and conditions imaginable. Almost all my time is in jet aircraft and turbo-props. I am at a point in my life where I want to pass along what I have learned. Unfortunately, I do not match the requirements stated by you in your article on finding an instructor. I do love to give BFRs and instrument competency checks to experienced pilots. I also enjoy flying with newly licensed pilots passing along what I know and enjoying sharing the excitement these young people experience.

I believe your "Over the Airwaves" to be a straight forward, non-politically correct journal that says it like it is. I know you have had an impact on my thinking and my friends. Thanks so much!
-- Ron Pogatchnik, Bakersfield, CA

"Great newsletter and web site! I enjoyed the January 1 issue and would like to sign up for it. I was referred to by a former flying club member that moved away but has stayed in touch. FYI I am a 49yr old Pilot with the following : Commercial, Instrument airplane, ASEL. I am currently working on my CFI
--Vin, Southbury, CT

"Robert : You are right on target with your comment and concerns about accident trends and the frustration that we in the FAA have experienced. Hope is on the was in the shape of the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team (FAASTeam).

FAA Safety Team Program Managers will be part of the reinvention of the FAA Safety Program. They will be remotely sited in their current duty location but will report directly to the Regional FAA Safety Team Manager. They may be responsible for their area of expertise over a larger geographic area than the district represented by their host office. Responsible for justifying and recommending new or amended aviation safety procedures; managing, establishing, implementing and coordinating the operations portion of the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team (FAASTeam) program within one or more assigned geographic areas which may include one or more FSDO areas.

This will not be a quick fix, in fact it has taken years to organize the program and we still have a long way to go. But working with industry, and folks like you in a partnership we will change the aviation trends by changing the system in which we all operate.
-- Obie Young, FAA Orlando Safety Program Manager

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Over the Airwaves is not intended to be your typical training, official news, or club-type social journal. Instead, its intent is to stimulate thought, enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to encourage the strong pilot, and to disturb the weaker pilot. With this breadth of scope, Over the Airwaves will evoke a number of reactions. Please feel free to share these reactions with me by clicking HERE.

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Fly safe,
Bob Miller, ATP, MCFI
Buffalo, NY
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100

[Disclaimer: Material contained in this e-newsletter is for informational purposes only. It should not be construed as directive, doctrinal, or instructive. Readers should consult with their flight schools, certificated flight instructors, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) and/or appropriate FAA publications including the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), and applicable FAA Advisory Circulars (ACs) for specific guidance relative to any information or before employing any recommendations contained in this e-publication. Further, nothing in this e-publication is intended to be inconsistent with or contrary to any official FAA rule or regulation, nor should such material be interpreted or construed as such. Over the Airwaves is intended exclusively for the purpose of promoting and enhancing heightened reader awareness of flight safety issues. This website is not a substitute for competent flight instruction. There are no representations or warranties of any kind made pertaining to this service/information and any warranty, express or implied, is excluded and disclaimed including but not limited to the implied warranties of merchantability and/or fitness for a particular purpose. Under no circumstances or theories of liability, including without limitation the negligence of any party, contract, warranty or strict liability in tort, shall the website creator/author or any of its affiliated or related organizations be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, consequential or punitive damages as a result of the use of, or the inability to use, any information provided through this service even if advised of the possibility of such damages.]

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