X	"When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return."                                                                    -- Leonardo DaVinci

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Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:                                                                                         

Stupid is What Stupid Does !     

Forrest  Gump wasn't the first person to offer up a workable definition of stupidity.  We pilots managed long ago to make stupidity a household word.  It was probably because our stupid actions attracted a lot of front page headlines.  When we screw up, the event is often accompanied by a lot of smoke and flames . . . and fatalities.

It doesn't take much time for any of us to list some of the many dumb things we do, like (1) running out of gas, or (2) landing with the gear up, or (3) forgetting to remove the tow bar before taking off, or (4) landing at the wrong airport, or (5) busting an assigned altitude.  I'll admit to having done two of these things myself!

We pilots do stupid things generally for one of two reasons.  The first is ignorance (poor training, lack of skills, absence of required knowledge).  The second is oversight (missed checklist item, distraction, "senior moment").  Whatever the reason, the nasty deed was done.  If we're lucky, no metal got bent, no bones got broken, and no ticket got lifted.  We caught a break!  We'll go on to fly another day.

The unfortunate pilot, on the other hand, paid a price ranging from a hefty legal defense expense on one end of the scale to the ultimate sacrifice on the other end of scale.  His or her misdeed attracted the attention of his insurance company, or the FAA, or his estate's beneficiaries . . . or all three.

Whether through ignorance or oversight, I can guarantee you two things.  If you fly long enough, you will one day do something stupid.  And, if you do enough stupid things, at least one will put you in the unfortunate category!  The key is to limit the number of stupid things you do to one, maybe two, but that's it!  As for me, I've spent my allocation.

How to avoid doing stupid things . . .

You avoid doing stupid things by remembering that "the devil is in the details."  It's often the little things, the little mistakes, the little omissions that quickly grow in size and significance.  We call this "the accident chain."  A missed item on a checklist, a forgotten maintenance item, a cockpit distraction, a complacent attitude, a weather factor we chose to ignore,  whatever.  Before we know it, we're in very serious trouble.

We can avoid doing stupid things by focusing upon the details of each flight we take - before, during, and even after as we mentally replay the events of the day.  A lesson learned today can prevent a tragedy tomorrow.  Next, we should go out and fly more often.  The data shows that the more frequently we fly, the more proficient we become.  Lastly, engage in a regular program of recurrent training. 

The airlines have a remarkable, near perfect, safety record.  Their pilots retrain every six months - and they always fly with at least two pilots.   To expect that we general aviation pilots can attain a similar safety record with less frequent recurrent training is, well . . . stupid! (Remember, stupid is what stupid does!)

Training for the Commercial pilot rating is fun !

Of all the advanced ratings, the commercial rating is the most fun.  The vast majority of it involves the mastery of basic ground reference (8's on Pylons) and performance maneuvers (chandelles, lazy 8s, etc.).  A reasonably good private or instrument pilot can master these maneuvers in less than 15 to 20 hours of dual instruction.

There must be some sort of magnetic force that draws instrument pilots blindly down to the touch down zone.  Rather than aborting a botched approach, far too many of us try to salvage a bad situation and wind up making a big hole in the ground.

Such was the case of a recent fatal TBM 700 crash while on the Localizer 17 approach to the Leesburg Airport in Virginia.  The NTSB listed the probable cause as the pilot's failure to fly a stabilized published approach procedure, and his failure to maintain adequate airspeed which led to an aerodynamic stall. 

Radar data showed that the airplane made a series of S-turns along the localizer course.  Three miles short of the runway, the airplane was 300 feet below the published MDA (minimum descent altitude).  It then made a left hand turn. It then pitched up and stalled.  Witnesses said the airplane came out of the fog nose down in a left bank. 

Experienced pilot aboard.

This high performance turboprop airplane was being flown by a private pilot with only 750 hours total time.  That could explain his difficulty handling this approach.  Curiously, the right seat pilot was an 8,000 ATP, CFII with type ratings in three different turboprop models and in B-737s.  Both pilots had completed TBM 700 training 18 months earlier.  Both pilots were IFR current with evidence of recent practice on localizer approaches.

What happened?

Unfortunately, we will never really know what was going in the cockpit.  The NTSB report gives us enough insight to know that the airplane continued to descend on the approach before it became established on the localizer.  This is BIG MISTAKE NUMBER ONE!  

All approach clearances go something like this, "Maintain xxxxx feet until established on the final approach course. . . "  The operative word in this approach clearance is "established."  In other words, DON'T descend until you are locked on the localizer course.  Clearly, the TBM 700 pilot did not do this.

Once the pilot discovered he was 300 feet below the MDA, he pulled back on the yoke to regain altitude. He apparently failed to push the throttle forward as he did this.  This is BIG MISTAKE NUMBER TWO! 

The radar reports revealed that the airplane's ground speed was 68 knots when it made its final left turn.  This put it fairly close to his Vso (stall speed in the landing configuration).  A sudden pitch up without additional power likely put the TBM 700 into a stall.  If yawed at the same time, a spin would assuredly result.

Why did the pilots continue descending on an unstabilized approach?

Again, we do not have enough information to draw complete and accurate conclusions in this crash.  But given the disparity in training and experience of the two pilots, it is quite reasonable to assume that BOTH men were at the controls.  The less experienced guy in the left seat was doing his best to get established on the final approach course.  The more experienced ATP/CFII in the right seat was giving him as much latitude as he reasonably could before taking the controls.  Not certain at the final instant what the other pilot was doing, both pilots pulled back on the yoke and neither pilot grabbed the throttle.  This is pure speculation, however.

Lesson for all of us!

There are several lessons here, but the most important lesson for all of us is, NEVER descend on an instrument approach unless you are firmly established on a known segment (solid black line) of the published approach course . . . NEVER, NEVER! 

Equally important, NEVER continue an instrument approach beyond the FAF (final approach fix) if you are not firmly established at the specified altitude on the final approach course . . . NEVER, NEVER!

The temptation to salvage a botched instrument approach inside the FAF can be as powerful as any human drive we experience.  It's like a magnetic force that seduces us downward.  To do so blindly or in an unstable manner can be deadly!

     

Peer Pressure	Poor decision making based upon emotional response to peers rather than evaluating a situation objectively.
Mind Set	The inability to recognize and cope with changes in the situation different from those anticipated or planned.
Get-There-Itis	This tendency, common among pilots, clouds the vision and impairs judgment by causing a fixation on the original goal or destination combined with a total disregard for any alternative course of action.
Duck-Under Syndrome	The tendency to sneak a peek by descending below minimums during an approach.  Based on a belief that there is always a built-in "fudge" factor that can be used or on an unwillingness to admit defeat and shoot a missed approach.
Scud Running	Pushing the capabilities of the pilot and the aircraft to the limits by trying to maintain visual contact with the terrain while trying to avoid physical contact with it. This attitude is characterized by the old pilot's joke:  "If it's  too bad to go IFR, we'll go VFR."
VFR into IMC Conditions	Continuing visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument conditions often leads to spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles.  It is even more dangerous if the pilot is not instrument qualified or current.
Getting Behind the Aircraft	Allowing events or the situation to control your actions rather than the other way around.  Characterized by a constant state of surprise at what  happens next.
Loss of Positional or Situation Awareness	Another case of getting behind the aircraft which results in not knowing where you are, an inability to recognize deteriorating circumstances, and/or the misjudgment of the rate of deterioration.
Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves	Ignoring  minimum fuel reserve requirements, either VFR or Instrument      Flight Rules (IFR), is generally the result of overconfidence, lack of flight planning, or ignoring the regulations.
Descent Below the Minimum Enroute Altitude	The duck-under syndrome (mentioned above) manifesting itself during the en route portion of an IFR flight.
Flying Outside the Envelope	Unjustified reliance on the (usually mistaken) belief that the aircraft's high  performance capability meets the demands imposed by the pilot's (usually overestimated) flying skills.
Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections,       Checklists, Etc.	Unjustified reliance on the pilot's short and long term memory, regular flying skills, repetitive and familiar routes, etc.

 

Seldom does a week go by when somebody doesn't ask me why I devote the time and energies to this freely circulated bi-weekly e-publication.  The answer is simple . . . to improve GA flight safety.

In the hands of a proficient, well trained pilot, general aviation is as safe as a walk in the park.  As a whole, however, general aviation is fairly risky endeavor.  For the poorly trained, non-current, non-proficient private pilot, it is downright dangerous.  According to AOPA's Air Safety Foundation's Nall Report (2003), we continue to experience over 500 general aviation fatalities each year - that's about 10 deaths each week.  Regrettably, 72.6 percent of these fatal accidents are attributed to pilot error.

Something more needs to be done to get inside the heads of today's general aviation pilots.  Heaven knows, there are numerous GA publications, membership organizations, and even the FAA aggressively putting a positive spin on the GA safety record.  This contributes, of course, to more new pilots, more new memberships, and more new airplanes and associated hardware being sold.  In the process, GA pilots get lulled into a false sense of security.

In truth, far more needs to be done at the GA flight training level if we are to move any closer to the remarkable, near-perfect safety record of the nation's airlines.  The aircraft manufacturing industry is doing its part to improve GA safety.  So is the FAA's air traffic control system.   Our flight training system (if there is one) is the weak link in the entire industry.

We have big name flight schools who, according to AOPA, are cranking out newly minted CFIs with only 15 hours of single engine time and only 20 hours to total solo time! [ASF Instructor Report, First Quarter, 2005]  These same schools are creating instrument rated pilots who have NEVER been inside a cloud! 

We have thousands of practicing CFIs throughout the U.S. who have less than 50 hours total solo time.  These instructors passed from private pilot, to instrument pilot, to commercial pilot, and to CFI without ever having logged more than 400 total miles of solo cross-country flight!  We have new CFIIs trained in the south applying for instructor jobs here in Buffalo, NY who have never experienced in-flight icing conditions!   Where is the experience they are supposed to be passing along to their students?

We do have a flight training problem!

When you add a watered down mandated recurrent training requirement to an already weak flight instruction system, it is little wonder why pilot error is responsible for three-quarters of all GA fatal accidents.  Airline pilots receive several days of mandated recurrent training every six months.  GA pilots receive one hour of flight and one hour of ground mandated recurrent training every two years!  Yet we are both flying in the same national airspace system . . . and mostly by ourselves rather than in two pilot cockpits with sophisticated autopilots and redundant systems.

So what's the solution?

Realistically, we will not see any significant tightening of the GA flight training system or recurrent training requirements.  The status quo lobby is just too large to fight.  Therefore, the solution must be found in the heads of GA pilots themselves.  If we can somehow get into their heads and convince them that their own safety in the skies is directly dependent upon the quality of the instruction they received and the frequency of recurrent training they engage in. 

This is a doable goal. Hopefully, those who have been reading "Over the Airwaves" every two weeks are getting this message.  That's why I spend the time and energies to prepare this e-publication.  If you know a pilot who can benefit from this message, forward "Over the Airwaves" to him or her.  Or click  HERE to add their name to the free subscription list.

True confession time, boys and girls.  Have you ever filed an IFR flight plan and forgot to include a legal alternate when required by forecast weather at your destination?  Fess up!  If you have, you're not alone (myself included).

Let's review the IFR alternate filing requirements per FAR 91.169

For every rule, there is an exception . . .

Not every airport can be used as a legal alternate.  An airport may not be qualified for alternate use if the airport NAVAID serving the airport is unmonitored, if the runway approach uses a Global Positioning System (GPS), or if the airport does not have weather reporting capabilities.

Here's how you can identify airports with non-standard alternate minimums:

Check the upper left section of the approach plate.  If you see a solid triangle with an "A" inside, non-standard alternate minimums apply.  Check elsewhere in the procedures book for those non-standard alternate minimums.

If your destination airport goes below minimums, must you fly to your filed alternate airport?

Answer:  Of course not!  The requirement to include an alternate airport on your flight plan per FAR 91.169 forces the pilot to plan ahead.  It confirms that the pilot has considered the weather at his/her destination and that he is satisfied that a suitable alternate exists with in the fuel range of his aircraft, including required reserves. 

Actually, your filed alternate is NOT included on the flight data strip that is passed along to each controller working your flight.  Thus, if you can't get into your destination airport, you can either fly to your filed alternate or any other airport you can find with above minimum weather conditions for the instrument approaches in use.

Last question - Will you be in trouble if you fail to include an alternate on your flight plan when indicated?

As in most required actions, the FAA operates on a "management by exception" basis.  There are only two times that come to mind when the FAA would likely bring an enforcement against you for failing to file a required alternative.  One would be if you got yourself boxed into a nasty weather situation and required emergency ATC assistance to help you find a suitable alternate.  The other would be in the event of a weather related accident.  I am sure that pilots have gotten busted on the filed alternate rule for other reasons as well.

Recommendation:  Get in the habit of including an alternate on EVERY IFR flight you take, regardless of weather.

I received the following comment from a reader that I do not know personally nor one that I ever gave flight instruction to.  He was kind enough, however, to confer upon me (based solely upon his reading of "Over the Airwaves") the same instructional characteristics as his own flight instructor.  I include his comment here because it speaks to how every flight instructor should be regarded by their students.

Find a new flight instructor if necessary . . .

Flight instruction should be both challenging and fun.  Each lesson should be enjoyable and personally rewarding as you explore the wonders of flight.  You should marvel at your personal accomplishments just as Kurt did with his flight instructor.  Sure, there will be periods in your training when you may feel discouraged or impatient to move on to the next phase of training.  When this happens, your instructor should be there to encourage you onward in a positive fashion. 

On the other hand, if your flight instruction experience is anything other than Kurt's, talk with your instructor.  Give him or her an opportunity to change his teaching style with you.  If he will not or can not, don't waste another minute.  Find another instructor.  Talk with other students at your airport, or go to another nearby airport and talk with flight students there. 

Good flight instructors are known by their students.

There are many health issues that can lead to a premature loss of flying privileges.  Two such issues are: (1) high blood pressure, and (2) adult-onset diabetes.  Each of these possible conditions can strike fear in the heart of maturing pilots as they face their medical examiner every two years or so.    I know . . . because it use to happen to me.

As every hypertensive and diabetic pilot knows, there are reams of printed information about how to control these disease entities through various drug therapies.  Unfortunately, there are far fewer publications telling us that, in many cases, the simple loss of 20 or 30 pounds of excess weight and a regular program (3x weekly) of exercise can dramatically lower blood pressure and can return blood glucose levels down into the normal range.   Again, I know . . . because it worked for me!

I was 55 years old, 30 pounds overweight, and did not exercise!

My blood pressure was pushing a dangerous 150/95 and I was spilling sugar into my urine.  The news was bad enough that I nearly failed my third class medical.  Fortunately, I appeared several months early for my biennial medical and my DME, realizing my deplorable lifestyle, allowed me to come back and try again after 12 weeks of aggressive fitness training and diet reform.  The alternative was, of course, drugs and a long process of seeking medical waivers.

I hired a personal trainer and began working out three times weekly at the local gym.  I also changed my eating habits dramatically.  Instead of skipping breakfast, I ate either oatmeal or five or six scrambled egg whites.  The remainder of my four daily meals consisted of high protein, low fat, low carbohydrate food choices.  I eliminated sweets altogether.

My blood pressure dropped to 125/84 and my urine remained free of sugar!

My DME's advice worked.  In 12 weeks, I shed 20 pounds and dropped from 28% body fat down to 19% body fat and my blood pressure was back in an acceptable range.  I also restored a fair amount of lost muscle tissue.

The good news is, after five years of this regimen, my weight is holding firm between 200 at 205 pounds (down from 230 pounds), my blood pressure remains constant at 125/80, and there's no hint of sugar in my urine.  Incidentally, my suit size dropped from 48 to 44. My pant waist went from 40" to 36".

The very best news . . . I feel good about myself!

It does not work for everybody . . . but it works for many

Sadly, far too many doctors, DMEs included, are quick to put us overweight and out of condition pilots on drugs.  Obviously, this does nothing to solve the underlying lifestyle problem . . . other than to, hopefully, get us through the FAA medical.  Unless the basic problem gets solved, it will likely worsen with age . . . to a point where drugs will not fix the problem.

You are chugging along at 9,000 feet in the clag.  Your radio is strangely quiet. You give Center a call.  No answer.  You repeat the call on radio #2.  Again, no answer.  You check the frequency.  Still nothing.  You try making a call on the emergency channel, 121.5.  Nothing.  All you hear is static.

Resourceful pilot that you are, you pull out your handheld radio and try making some calls.  You're too far away for your tiny transmitter to reach anybody.  Besides, your batteries are nearly dead.

A check of your last known position puts you 30 miles south of Baltimore enroute to East Hampton, Long Island, NY.  This is the busiest airspace in the world.

What do you do?

Again, exercising your remarkable ingenuity, you squawk 7600 and begin listening on the audio side of the nearest VOR station, hoping that ATC understands your plight and will start talking with you through the VOR. Again, nothing. 

Think before you act ! !

A loss of communications in IMC is a serious problem - perhaps even more serious than you think. Fortunately, it rarely happens anymore due to greatly improved aircraft radios.

When your radios go silent, your first inclination is to follow the provisions of FAR 91.185 (Communications Failure).  Warning: This could be the very worst thing to do! 

Why might FAR 91.185 actions be the worst thing you can do?

Looking at the historical context of FAR 91.185, it was written back in the days when airplanes were equipped with unreliable vacuum tube communications radios.  These radios were independent of the navigation radios that were in different boxes.  FAR 91.185 was also written back before we had nearly universal radar coverage.  In those days, when the radio tanked in IMC conditions, the actions required by FAR 91.185 were the only reasonable actions to take.

Things are much different today.  Today's communications and navigation radios share much of the same circuitry in the same box.  If the com side of that box fails, the nav side could be next to go.  If that problem migrates to the second nav/com radio in the scud, you have a very, very serious problem. If the problem was caused by a fire, your vacuum lines could go next. This would be NO time to continue slogging along your assigned route! 

Then what is a girl supposed to do?

First and foremost, THINK!  What could have caused a sudden loss of both radios?  Perhaps it was an electrical short under the cowl that took out the avionics bus. Maybe it was a leak in the fuel line or a seized alternator belt pulley.  Any of these events could trigger a fire that melts through the wiring and/or a vacuum line.  Wow . . . no electrical and no vacuum in the IMC conditions.  Chances of survival are nil.

Troubleshoot the problem.  Check the avionics master switch.  Check the circuit-breakers and fuses.  Recycle the radio on/off switch.  Check and reset the frequencies.  If both radios are dead in IMC, regard the situation as a full blown emergency and exercise your emergency authority under FAR 91.3 accordingly.  Take the following steps:

1. Squawk 7700.

2. Descend to a VFR altitude (no other IFR traffic should be at a VFR altitude in IMC conditions.)

3. Fly to known VFR conditions or get on the first instrument approach you can find and land.

Remember, in the scenario described above, time is working against you.  You have to get on the ground as quickly as possible.

Exceptions Apply . . .

As with any rule, advisory, or guideline, there are exceptions.  If you experience total communications failure while executing a STAR (standard terminal arrival route), or SID (standard instrument departure), or while you are on a published instrument approach, FAR 91.185 works fine.  Follow those rules.

What will ATC say about your actions?

ATC does not like to have airplanes without radios flying through busy airspace in IMC conditions.  The only action they can reasonably take is to clear the airspace in front of you.  Imagine having to do this on a busy Friday night along the eastern seaboard.  Arrivals and departures into and out of JFK, LGA, EWR, and PHL could be tied up for hours should you decide to continue NORDO (no radios) on your planned route per FAR 91.185 in the scenario above.  Remember, if ATC can't talk with you, they're not really sure where you might be going.

In short, ATC wants you OUT of their airspace.  If you are squawking 7700 or even if they can't reach you by radio, you'll have their attention.  In short, do what you can to land quickly.

Will you be violating FAR 91.185?

No!   FAR 91.3(b) says, "In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency."  This includes FAR91.185.

In summary, regard total communications failure in IMC as full-blown emergency and respond accordingly.

If you hang around any airport long enough you'll see some entertaining things happening.  Fortunately, most of these things have uneventful outcomes.  Others, however, lead to tragic ends. 

Why do these things happen?

The failure to look out the window is likely the most common reason why airplanes run into things on the airport surface.  Here, one or both pilots are focused on activities going on inside the cockpit.  They're setting radios, reviewing charts, or copying clearances as they taxi to the departure runway.

Even more startling are cockpit crews who are cleared for landing on one runway and who inadvertently land on another.  Assuming that tower controller knows what he or she is doing, the crew sets up for landing without ever scanning the runway to insure it is clear of obstacles.

This . . . can happen to you!

Runway incursions happen at all kinds of airports, large or small, tower controlled or not.  Cockpit distractions, failure to see or abide by airport signage, ignored NOTAMS, or simple airport disorientation all contribute to these tragic events.

When in doubt, don't move . . . . .ask!

Every student pilot should be taken by his instructor to multiple Class B airports throughout the training process.  Several of these flights should be done at night when rain and low visibility obscures outside vision.  Here, the student will learn the importance of securing sequential taxi instructions from the tower - rather than nosing around a confusing airport by himself.

Equally important, every pilot should learn how to use the radio to move safely around non-towered fields.  Always announce when you are clear of the active runway;  announce when you are taking the active.  Landing traffic should always announce there position on the final approach course prior to landing.

Chicago's Midway Field is a great airport (see airport diagram left) to go into when visiting the Windy City.  I've used it many times since the closure of Meigs Field.  But it is not for the timid pilot.  There are five (actually ten) runways and numerous taxiways.  This is no place to be wandering around on your own.  Always request progressive taxi instructions from the tower.

And above all . . . look out the window!!!!

I continue to marvel at the number of pilots I fly with who have never experienced a full stall break, much less a spin!  I discover this disarming fact almost every time I do an aircraft checkout or a biennial flight review.  And we wonder why stall/spin tragedies continue to occur. 

Equally distressing is the number of private pilots I encounter who have never experienced actual instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).  Similarly, we wonder why continued VFR flight into IMC conditions is the number one weather-related killer of pilots!  Sadly, most pilots are not as fortunate as Kurt Lebo (see quote above).

There is a problem here . . .

It's tempting to blame FAR 61.107 (Private Pilot Flight Proficiency Requirements) or the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards for this serious deficiency in pilot skills.  After all, its the FAA that sets the requirements and standards.  It's also tempting to blame the Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs), but they are simply assessing performance against a weak standard.  The cruel reality is, if the FARs, PTSs, or DPEs were the problem, the likelihood of seeing significant change in any of these areas in our lifetime is remote.

In truth, I believe the real blame lies squarely on the shoulders of the certificated flight instructor community.  CFIs have enough latitude in what they can and will teach to insure that each of their primary students can safely extricate themselves from a spin and can maneuver comfortably in the clouds.  Only the flight instructor will know, for sure, what his or her students are capable of. 

Here's the solution . . .

Those flight instructors who do not teach spin recoveries are likely those CFIs who, themselves, are NOT comfortable doing spins.  Their personal operational envelopes are too small to accommodate these sophisticated maneuvers.  The solution is simple.  Those CFI's who fall in this category should secure the additional spin and/or aerobatic training necessary to make them both more skilled and more comfortable performing these life-saving maneuvers.

Similarly, those flight instructors who do not take their primary students into actual instrument conditions either do not have the training (or instrument rating) to provide this level of meaningful instruction.  The solution is simple . . . get it!

Mistaken Beliefs . . .

There are a couple of mistaken beliefs that some instructors use to excuse themselves from providing these training experiences.  The first is classic.  It says, "the best way to prevent stall/spin accidents is to teach students how to avoid them in the first place."  This naive take on the problem presumes that extreme turbulence, thunderstorm penetration, disorientation, or vertigo never sneaks up unexpectedly on a pilot.

The second mistake is equally classic.  It says, "if we expose private, non-instrument rated pilots to the inside of clouds, they will be tempted to seek them out themselves."  This myopic kind of thinking disregards the basic judgment skills required of any pilot who takes to the air.

And the Reality . . .

As you see, there are many reasons why primary flight students never experience stall/spin recovery training or significant actual IMC experience.  But rather than blaming others or "the system," all pilots themselves should aggressively reach out and secure this training on their own.  Find a qualified CFII and get this life saving training.  Once you found your training source schedule regular, every six month, training and tune-up sessions.

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