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Sunday, August 7, 2005 Vol. II No. 16
Prepared by Bob Miller, ATP,
MCFI |
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Sunday, August 7, 2005 Vol. II No. 16
Prepared by Bob Miller, ATP,
MCFI |
Welcome to the
Over the Airwaves
aviation newsletter. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing is
being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the world.
Its aim
is to promote flight
safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build enthusiasm
for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
If a pilot were to focus his or her training and self-development on that aspect of aviation that contributes to more fatalities than any other . . . he or she would master weather factors! According to AOPA's Air Safety Foundation's 2004 Nall Report, more than seven out of 10 pilot-induced fatal accidents are attributed to weather. And the worst of these weather-caused fatal accidents, by an overwhelming margin of 87.5 percent, is continued VFR flight into IFR conditions! For the VFR-only pilot, this means sticking his or her nose into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). If he does, there is an overwhelming chance he (and his passengers) will not come out alive. That is, of course, unless he had the training, proficiency, and presence of mind to simply reverse course and come right back out. Many VFR-only pilots do not have either the training, proficiency, or presence of mind to safely escape from IMC conditions! Actual Case History: I was having breakfast several weeks ago with a young man who recently completed his private pilot certificate at a neighboring airport. We were talking about the relative risks of poor weather flying. In a tone of frustration, he mentioned to me that he had no poor weather flying experience. I responded saying, "You must have received at least three hours or more of instrument training in your private pilot course." "No," he said. "My instructor told me that it was useless to train if I couldn't see the ground! I received my required instrument training all under a hood!" How sad, I thought. Buffalo, NY has more cloudy, low weather days than nearly any other place in the nation, and this poor soul was relegated to a "view limiting device" for instrument training! What is he going to do if he's caught in unforecasted, worsening weather conditions? Sadly, he'll likely become another aviation statistic.
Biggest fault with the way we train pilots!!! If 70 percent of all pilot-induced GA accidents are attributable to weather factors and 87.5 percent of these accidents are caused by continued VFR flight into IMC conditions, shouldn't we be providing primary flight students with more than three hours of hood work? No matter how you cut it, no pilot with just three hours of simulated IFR training has the skills to safely perform a 180 degree, standard rate turn out of the clouds and back into VFR conditions! In reality, continued VFR flight into IMC conditions doesn't happen the way we think it does. Instead, the typical VFR to IFR scenario occurs when either haze or lowering ceilings create sudden widespread instrument meteorological conditions. The only escape is to maneuver, by instruments, to distant VFR conditions and land. When this occurs, the pilot - having never seen ACTUAL IFR conditions, begins to panic. Even if he had good "simulated" instrument skills, his mind shuts down in fear brought about by a totally unfamiliar environment. "Well . . . he shouldn't have been flying that day, anyway!" Okay, it's time we wake up and take of whiff of the coffee. It's time that we understand that VFR-only pilots take cross-country trips. That's why many of them obtained their private pilot certificate in the first place. Hey . . . even the FARs require a VFR pilot to have at least 50 hours of cross country flight before he can qualify for an instrument ticket! So what happens on many cross country flights? Answer: STUFF! That's right! Stuff happens. Haze thickens, ceilings lower, rains fall, whatever. Could it possibly be true that the weather forecasts were incorrect? So we have a hapless private pilot who paid $9,000 to his flight school for a private pilot's certificate who is now caught in STUFF. The first thing he does is reach in his flight bag for his foggles . . . because that was how he was trained to fly on instruments! In its own defense, the flight school or flight instructor says, "Hey, the FAA says that primary pilots require only three hours of instrument flight, simulated at that! What are you beating me up for?" Sadly, the flight school/flight instructor is right! They're fulfilling the minimum training requirement put forth in the FARs. See the problem here? We can't change them . . . but we can change us! No, we will not be seeing any changes in the FARs anytime soon. Nor will be seeing any changes in the Part 141 FAA approved flight school curriculum. Nor will be seeing many DPEs conducting Private Pilot check rides in IMC conditions. But we can make changes in ourselves! If you are a VFR pilot and your flight training provided you with little or no actual IFR experience, or if your logbook reveals little or no (less than 6 to 10 hours) actual IFR flight, I invite you to pay very close attention to the VFR into IFR flight fatality rates. More importantly, stop recommending your flight instructor or flight school to your friends. Next, engage a flight instructor to fly with you the next time the weather goes below VFR conditions. Go into the clouds and the low, rainy scud. Get comfortable with the knowledge that your airplane flies the same way in dreary days as if flies on clear days. Obtain the skills to safely extricate yourself from unexpected adverse weather conditions. If you do this . . . and every other VFR-only pilot does likewise, we could see a dramatic reduction in continued VFR into IMC flight fatalities!
  It's
hard to imagine how each years' Oshkosh AirVenture could get any better. But it does! Hey, everybody likes to go
to Disneyworld, but what reasonably mature adult goes to Disneyworld
year after year after year?
Not so with aviators
and Oshkosh! We return to Oshkosh year after year in
ever-increasing numbers to immerse ourselves in a literal ocean of
airplanes - vintage, new, civil, military, homebuilt,
ultra-light, light sport, experimental, jumbo, and even celestial.
It is really the
people!
While airplanes are
the central theme of Oshkosh, Oshkosh is really the people.
Airplane people, to be precise. Airplane people are not like
ordinary people. Instead, airplane people are goal oriented,
high achievers who accomplished what 99.5 percent of the U.S.
population never did. They learned to fly airplanes!
Ordinary people see
the future . . . and worry - about Social Security, the economy, the
war, and simply getting old. Airplane people, on the other
hand, see the future and get excited. They see new airplanes
that go faster and higher.
And they see the
prices for all this dropping at a precipitous rate. Who would
have ever thought of owning and operating a private jet for the same
price as a new high performance, single engine, propeller driven
aircraft? Heck . . . who would have thought of private space
travel in our lifetime????
The photos are
in!
Should circumstances
have prevented you from attending AirVenture 2005, I prepared a
photo page of shots taken last week. They are included in
random order with a brief caption for each. Hopefully,
by viewing these photos, you can get a sense of the Oshkosh
excitement! Unfortunately, these photos do NOT provide you the
seductive aroma of 100LL or Jet-A as it wafts over the grounds or the
roaring scream of a pair of F-16s in a tactical climb with
afterburners glowing. You only get these senses satisfied by
going to Oshkosh!
The linked photo page
is graphically intensive. Even with a fast Internet
connection, it may take a minute or two to load. Click
HERE to
view these wonderful photos.
  It
was a clear October night in 2004 when a Cessna 172 VFR-only pilot
called Flight Service for a briefing. The pilot and one
passenger departed from MacArthur Field on Long Island, NY.
They made one intermediate stop in Farmingdale, Long Island
before heading up to their final destination in Johnston, NY.
The Pre-flight
Briefing:
Their preflight
briefing revealed the presence of marginal VFR conditions along
their planned
route of flight, with thickening cloud cover and scattered showers.
The specialist said that VFR flight was not recommended. The specialist further stated that if the pilot
waited until the following morning, the weather would likely improve.
The pilot elected to
depart immediately.
The flight proceeded uneventfully for approximately two-thirds of
the planned route. The pilot was receiving flight following, and
asked the controller how high the clouds were, so that he could get
out of them.
The next thing that happened! Near Albany, NY, the airplane then descended rapidly in a left turn and struck trees. Both the pilot and his passenger were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The above accident
summary was taken directly from the NTSB accident report. The
NTSB language in such tragic accidents is nearly always the same.
We read that the pilot received a FSS briefing; the specialist
advised the VFR flight was not recommended; the airplane
descended rapidly in a left turn and struck trees.
The only difference between the many such NTSB are the (1) dates;
(2) type airplane; and (3) number of fatalities.
Analysis . . .
The weather briefing
suggested a mixed bag as far as clouds and visibility were
concerned. There was certainly a lot of good VFR along the
planned route of flight. There were no reported witnesses, so
we can only speculate as to what happened. It is evident,
however, that the pilot found himself inside of a cloud.
Instead of making a
standard rate turn back out of the cloud or even a gradual, wings
level climb or descent to VFR weather, the radar track showed a
"rapid left turn." Here is more from the NTSB Report:
It is apparent from the NTSB report that the aircraft entered a spin before crashing nose down into the tree covered terrain below. Could proper training and follow-up recurrent training have prevented this crash? Unfortunately, the NTSB seldom looks at the kind of training a pilot victim received. Thus, there's no way to scientifically correlate training with flight safety. We do know, however, that people can be taught to safely extricate themselves from IFR conditions solely by reference to the instruments IF . . . they don't panic! The question, then, is why do VFR-only pilots panic when they find themselves suddenly in IMC conditions? Could it be that they had never been inside the clouds before? If they had, could it be that they never practiced what they learned or experienced with an appropriately rated pilot at their side? You be the judge! Sure . . . this guy took a chance. Piecing the facts of this accident together, it is apparent that the pilot made a judgment error. As a VFR-only pilot, he shouldn't have launched into the reported weather conditions. But he did, perhaps hoping that the weather along his route of flight would improve. This judgment error cost him and his passengers their lives. Could he have, on the other hand, saved the day had he had any basic instrument flying skills. I think so.
"Many of us in the general aviation business have been guilty of perpetuating a big lie that flying little airplanes is inherently safe. The facts just do not bear this out," added King. GA Teaching and Practice is Flawed!!
According to King, we have become very good at teaching piloting
skills. But the NTSB data reveals that 85 percent of all
accidents are caused by a failure in risk management, not skill
"On the surface, this is good advice. But nobody ever deliberately takes off into weather they cannot handle. But over 50 percent of all GA accidents are caused by weather," says King. How is this somewhat paradoxical sounding statement explained? The answers is . . . weather changes, often unpredictably. A pilot takes off in good weather and before long, the weather begins to deteriorate. Winds pick up, change direction, ceiling lowers, visibility declines. The hapless pilot has had little or no x-wind training, he's never been inside a cloud before. All he remembers his instructor telling him is, "Herb. . . never fly in bad weather!" Poor Herb was never taught anything about risk management. Herb's flight instructor never trained in high crosswinds. His three hours of required instrument flight were all conducted in simulated conditions. In short, Herb was never given the opportunity to develop effective risk management decision skills. Sadly, Herb is likely to find himself among the over 550 general aviation accidents that occur each year . . . 75 percent of which are attributed to pilot error. 
Practicing flight at
minimal controllable airspeed is a wonderful exercise for both
student pilots and experienced veterans alike. Performed
properly, it is the one exercise that demands close control of all
four forces of flight. It is also one of several flight
exercises where the Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) can obtain an
instant reading on the pilot's overall skill level.
Speed
Instability . . .
As described in
chapter 4 of the Airplane Flying Handbook (AC
8083-3A), when flying more
slowly than minimum drag speed (LD/MAX) the airplane will exhibit a characteristic known as “speed instability.” If the airplane is disturbed by even the slightest turbulence, the airspeed will decrease.
Beware of the
stall . . .
As airspeed decreases,
the total drag also increases resulting in a further loss in
airspeed. The total drag continues to rise and the speed
continues to fall. Unless more power is applied and/or the
nose is lowered, the speed will continue to decay right down to the
stall.
This is an extremely
important factor in the performance of slow flight. The pilot
must understand that, at speed less than minimum drag speed, the
airspeed is unstable and will continue to decay if allowed to do so.
So why do we
practice slow flight?
We practice slow
flight because it helps us to understand all the elements of basic
aerodynamics. For example, as airspeed is reduced, the flight
controls become less effective and the normal nose down tendency is
reduced.
The elevators become
less responsive and coarse control movements become necessary to
retain control of the airplane. The slipstream effect produces a
strong yaw so the application of rudder is required to maintain
coordinated flight. The secondary effect of applied rudder is to
induce a roll, so aileron is required to keep the wings level. This
can result in flying with crossed controls.
During these changing
flight conditions, proficient pilots learn to re-trim the airplane
as often as necessary to compensate for changes in control
pressures. If the airplane has been trimmed for cruising
speed, heavy aft control pressure will be needed on the elevators,
making precise control impossible. If too much speed is lost,
or too little power is used, further back pressure on the elevator
control may result in a loss of altitude or a stall.
When the desired pitch
attitude and minimum control airspeed have been established,
proficient pilots learn to continually cross-check the attitude
indicator, altimeter, and airspeed indicator, as well as outside
references to ensure that accurate control is being maintained.
Maneuvering in
slow flight . . .
When the attitude,
airspeed, and power have been stabilized in straight flight, turns
should be practiced to determine the airplane’s controllability
characteristics at this minimum speed. During the turns, power
and pitch attitude may need to be increased to maintain the airspeed
and altitude.
The objective is to
acquaint the pilot with the lack of maneuverability at minimum
speeds, the danger of incipient stalls, and the tendency of the
airplane to stall as the bank is increased.
A stall may also occur
as a result of abrupt or rough control movements when flying at this
critical airspeed. Abruptly raising the flaps while at minimum
controllable airspeed will result in lift suddenly being lost,
causing the airplane to lose altitude or perhaps stall.
Once flight at minimum
controllable airspeed is set up properly for level flight, a descent
or climb at minimum controllable airspeed can be established by
adjusting the power as necessary to establish the desired rate of
descent or climb. The beginning pilot should note the increased
yawing tendency at minimum control airspeed at high power settings
with flaps fully extended. In some airplanes, an attempt to climb at
such a slow airspeed may result in a loss of altitude, even with
maximum power applied.
  Few
things are more infuriating to the proficient pilot than to be on
downwind in trail of a pilot on a two or three mile base to final
turn!
Why Such Large
Traffic Patterns?
Why is it necessary to
extend the downwind leg more than 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the runway
end before turning base? Good question.
A proficient pilot
should be able to commence his final descent from the traffic
pattern altitude (TPA) on downwind, abeam the numbers, at 600 to 700
feet per minute and reach the runway touchdown point with no further
pitch or power adjustments.
All of this should be
achieved within 1/4 (no more than 1/2) mile from the runway
touchdown point. Sure, this takes practice, but that what
recurrent training and practice is all about.
Benefits of
Flying Close-in Traffic Patterns . . .
 "See
and avoid" is the biggest benefit of flying close-in traffic
patterns. You can see all of the other guys in the pattern and
waiting to depart if you remain in a close-in pattern. Compare
this with trying to find an aircraft on a two or three mile final on
a hazy day.
Shorter
departure and arrival delays are the second biggest benefit
of close-in traffic patterns. Let's remember that a pilot on
downwind cannot turn base until the guy on final passes abeam of
him. If that guy on final is still two or three miles out, the
downwind guy has to wait that much longer . . . and so will the guy
behind him, and so on!
Safer operations
is the next biggest factor. The closer airplanes get
to the ground, the fewer options they have should something go
wrong. Ergo, the closer low flying airplanes are to the
runway, the safer they become. I have sat with numerous
student pilots low and long on final. This is particularly
scary at night! "What are you going to do if the winds
shears from headwind to tailwind?" "What are you going to do
if you suddenly lost power?"
Development of
better pilot skills
is an important
by-product of close-in traffic patterns, as well.
Shorter downwind, base, and final legs means that things happen a
quicker. Proper power settings, flap position, and airspeeds
need to come under control sooner. This requires faster
planning and more proficient stick and rudder skills.
If you are still a
non-believer in close-in traffic patterns, go out and fly a few just
for the heck of it. Once you experience them, you will become
a believer!
The FAA has also announced its intention to make the TFR over Washington, DC permanent. They'll be calling this airspace "National Defense Airspace." The NDA will reportedly extend east beyond Baltimore, west beyond Dulles International Airport in Virginia, north to Gaithersburg, Md., and about 30 miles south of Washington. Camel's Nose in the Tent Door This proposed action makes permanent the first large swath of US airspace that GA aircraft cannot enter. If it is allowed to stand, big cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles could be clamoring to lock out general aviation. After that, who knows what will be next. "The government has failed to assess the impact of what was intended as a temporary security enhancement on pilots, on air traffic controllers, or on airports and the businesses based there," says AOPA's Phil Boyer. "No general aviation aircraft has ever been used in a terrorist attack. And the government has determined that not a single ADIZ violation was terrorist-related." If there was ever a time to get behind AOPA and its efforts to protect our flying interests, it is now!
Here's a simple little review. Take a minute or two and be sure you have these definitions right in your head. Indicated Altitude— That altitude read directly from the altimeter (uncorrected) when it is set to the current altimeter setting. True Altitude— The vertical distance of the airplane above sea level—the actual altitude. It is often expressed as feet above mean sea level (MSL). Airport, terrain, and obstacle elevations on aeronautical charts are true altitudes. Absolute Altitude— The vertical distance of an airplane above the terrain, or above ground level (AGL). Pressure Altitude— The altitude indicated when the altimeter setting window (barometric scale) is adjusted to 29.92. This is the altitude above the standard datum plane, which is a theoretical plane where air pressure (corrected to 15°C) equals 29.92 in. Hg. Pressure altitude is used to compute density altitude, true altitude, true airspeed, and other performance data. Density Altitude— This altitude is pressure altitude corrected for variations from standard temperature. When conditions are standard, pressure altitude and density altitude are the same. If the temperature is above standard, the density altitude is higher than pressure altitude. If the temperature is below standard, the density altitude is lower than pressure altitude. This is an important altitude because it is directly related to the airplane’s performance.
If you were to sit along side a busy runway on a
windy day, such as at Oshkosh or Sun'n Fun, you'll observe lots of
interesting landings. Looking closer, you will note that the
Special attention required It is during the after-landing rollout that special
attention is required to maintain directional control by the use of
rudder or nose wheel steering while keeping the upwind wing from
rising by the use It is here that a good deal of unlearning is required! In a crosswind from the left, for example, wind pressure on the left side of the tail pushes the nose to the left as the airplane travels down the runway. We automobile drivers are taught to "steer into the direction of the skid." If we were to "steer the airplane down the runway" (as we would in a car), we'd swing the control wheel (or stick) to the right, e.g., into the skid. The left wing would rise, thereby exposing it to the crosswind. With the nose already moving left and the left wing now lifting, disaster (or at least a prop strike) may be only seconds away! The proper x-wind landing follow-through procedure . . . Again, assume a left x-wind as shown in the graphic above. You've touched down with the left wing properly kept low. Continue to hold hard left aileron until coming to stop. Apply sufficient right rudder pedal pressure to keep the nose pointing directly down the runway. Remember, the x-wind will be pushing against the tail . . . thereby forcing the nose to the left.
How serious is this x-wind landing problem?? How serious is the x-wind landing problem? According AOPA's Air Safety Foundation's 2004 Nall Report, more accidents (37.5%) occur during landing than in any other phase of flight (see table below).
While the accident do not break down the wind conditions during landing accidents, we can assume the presence of a x-wind in a number of these accidents. The good news is, relatively few people (3.8%) actually die in landing accidents. The most serious outcomes tend to be damaged propellers, wings, and egos. Proper instruction and practice is the key!! It takes substantial x-wind (15 to 20 knots with higher gusts) to learn effective, proficient x-wind landing technique. Do not practice this technique without an experienced flight instructor aboard!
When coupled with the last fading light of day, we soon lost ground contact at the same time we lost the horizon. Instant instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) enveloped us! Before I could obtain an instrument clearance, ATC called us with a traffic alert. The controller advised us of faster moving helicopter traffic at our six o'clock, two miles, moving in the same direction and at the same altitude! A formula for disaster . . . Note, there was nothing in the weather briefing that suggested that we would find ourselves in solid IMC conditions within the first 15 minutes of our training flight. Nor did we expect to be on a collision course with another aircraft. But this is stuff of tragic accidents. We took immediate evasive actions by climbing another 1,000', eventually reaching the cool, clear air above. Imagine, however, that this had been a VFR-only pilot. What would have been his options? Tough call, right? Message is simple . . . it's a fool's paradise! VFR-only pilots MUST have sufficient instrument skills to safely maneuver out of IMC conditions, period! If they don't have these skills, events such as the one described above could have had tragic consequences. Remember . . . simulated instrument training in anything less than a full-motion, airline level simulator, is a fool's paradise. If you want to be sure of your instrument flying skills, you must learn and train in actual instrument conditions. And you must be current!
Strangely enough, one of the most outspoken
critics of the Practical Test Standards (PTS) as a tool to teach
people how to fly is none other than the FAA itself!
For example, Michael W.
Brown points out that the PTS borrows heavily from the training maneuvers developed during the early days of powered flight. For this reason, a private pilot trained to standards outlined in the Civil Aeronautics Regulations, circa 1940s, would likely do well in most operations required by today's practical test. Not surprisingly, today's flying environment bears very little resemblance to 1940's type flying. Cessna, for example, is no longer building C-172s with steam gauges. They're all coming with glass cockpits. Extensive accident analysis reveals that most pilot induced accidents are a result of poor judgment, weak decision-making skills, and poor risk management practice. Continued VFR flight into IMC conditions, which is the number one pilot killer of all weather related accidents, are nearly always caused by poor judgment, decision-making, and risk management skills. Instructors spend hours on teaching short and soft field landings with little emphasis on when NOT to attempt a short or soft field landing! The recently revised Instrument PTS requires that pilot demonstrate proficiency with circling approaches . . . so that's what instructors teach. Again, they teach this with little, if any, instruction on when NOT to conduct a circling approach in the real world. The PTS could be leading us astray. See box below for what Michael Brown of the FAA has to say about the PTS:
What is your flight instructor teaching you? There are currently two models of flight instruction in current use today. One is the classic maneuvers-based training that specifically addresses the areas of operation specified in the Practical Test Standards (PTS). Most Part 141 FAA approved flight school curricula are based upon this model. Here, students are taught to pass the checkride, secure their certificate, then move up to the next rating. Nearly all such training is conducted in the local practice area and nearby airports and in simple, desktop-type (FAA approved) flight simulators. The other model is scenario-based training. Here, primary students and pilots working on advanced ratings spend most of their instructional hours in the national airspace system and distant airports rather than in the local practice area and familiar, home town airports. The first lesson for a primary pilot, for example, involves a cross-country flight, the second lesson takes him or her into the clouds, the third exposes him to cross-wind landings, and the fourth emphasizes ATC communications. It is important to note that all of the required areas of operation contained in the PTS are addressed in scenario-based training, but they are introduced in the context of real world flying rather than in the confines of the local practice area or FAA approved flight simulator. Traditional, maneuvers-based training takes longer and therefore is more costly! Which flight instruction model are you receiving? If it is the first (maneuvers-based training), plan on spending much more time and money learning how to fly or to obtain your next rating than is necessary! Students at Middle Tennessee State University, using scenario-based training, get through both their private and instrument ratings in about 90 hours, according to Dr. Paul Craig, MTSU Department Chairman. Students receiving traditional maneuvers-based training typically require more than 130 hours to receive these two ratings. Figuring an hourly training rate of $130 (rental aircraft and instructor), this translates to a $5,200 savings! A much safer and more proficient pilot as a result! Remember, the primary goal of all flight instruction should NOT be to get the student through the next checkride. Instead, it should be to expand his zone of competence and confidence so that he can meet any unforeseen flight challenge. The FAA (Michael Brown, manager, certification branch) says that when a person is able to do this, he or she has moved from simply being a flight instructor to becoming a teacher of flight! In summary, scenario-based training is not just another way of teaching people how to fly. Instead, it is a quantum leap away from the repetitive drills, rote learning, teach-to-the-test type instruction that is largely responsible for the fact that over 75 percent of all general aviation accidents are officially attributed to pilot error! Despite the enlightened views of the FAA's Michael Brown, it will be years before we will see any significant changes in the Practical Test Standards (PTS). It will likely be an equal number of years before the majority of all Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) change their expectations regarding pilot proficiency - hence what what they test on the checkride. Given this fact, we will not be seeing any significant change from maneuvers-based training to scenario-based training among the nation's flight instruction community in the foreseeable future. But should YOU be fortunate enough to find an instructor that uses scenario-based training . . . consider yourself very lucky, indeed!
Read the exciting accounts of my numerous business and pleasure flights aboard my turbocharged Cessna 210. This unedited book is being prepared for publication. Click HERE to open the table of contents. From there, you can open and read each chapter.
Click HERE to view what other readers have had to say about "Over the Airwaves ."
Over the Airwaves is not intended to be your typical training, official news, or
club-type social journal. Instead, its intent is to stimulate
thought, enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to encourage the
strong pilot, and to disturb the weaker pilot. With this
breadth of scope, Over the Airwaves will evoke a number of
reactions. Please feel free to share these reactions with me
by clicking
HERE.
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Contrary
to popular belief, general aviation is NOT inherently safe,
according to John King of John and Martha King Flight Schools.
"On a per mile bases, general aviation is seven times more
lethal than automobiles and 49 times more lethal than airline
travel," said King before a packed audience at Oshkosh this
year! 
deficiency!
He adds that this is because the way we traditionally teach pilots
to fly is flawed. Rather than taking pilots into the system,
into the crosswinds, into the weather, we teach them not to fly when
the weather is bad. [Note: the photo of the slide on the
left came from John King's presentation.]
Just
about the time we were getting a warm and fuzzy feeling about the
FAA, they went ahead and announced that criminal action will be
taken against any GA pilot that penetrates the airspace around
Washington, DC. This includes fines and prison for any pilot
that enters the outer ring around the Washington, DC ADIZ.
As
any pilot who has just completed a private, instrument, or
commercial checkride knows, Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) love
to ask questions about altitude.
More importantly, however, knowing and understanding the various
altitude definitions could save your life!
greatest
apparent control problems do not occur at touchdown. Instead,
they occur the first few seconds of the landing rollout.
The
METAR reported scattered clouds at 25,000' with visibility greater
than six miles. My student and I launched into the evening
sunset over Western New York. The unseasonably hot weather
combined with moisture-laden air generated a haze layer between
2,500' and 6,000' AGL. 
Brown,
FAA Manager, Certification Branch, Flight
Standards' General Aviation and Commercial Division, writes in
the FAA Aviation News (July/August, 2005) that "training
focused strictly on PTS areas of operation is woefully
inadequate in preparing pilots to exercise their
responsibilities as pilot-in-command" (p.27).
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Up for "Over the Airwaves" . . . . .
